16 NEV. L.J. 57, RICHMOND - FINAL.DOCX

1/15/16 1:34 PM

FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
CLAIMS AGAINST LAWYERS
Douglas R. Richmond*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 57
I. UNDERSTANDING FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION........................... 63
A. Common Law Fraud...................................................................... 63
B. Fraudulent Concealment ............................................................... 70
C. Constructive Fraud ....................................................................... 75
D. Negligent Misrepresentation ......................................................... 77
E. The Role of Rules of Professional Conduct................................... 82
II. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES ............................................................................ 84
A. Settlement Negotiations in Litigation ............................................ 84
B. Litigators’ Allegedly Fraudulent Statements Outside of
Settlement Negotiations ................................................................. 88
C. Third Party Reliance on a Lawyer’s Statements in a Real
Estate Transaction......................................................................... 93
D. The Dean Foods Opinion Controversy ......................................... 99
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 103
INTRODUCTION
Most lawyers are competent, diligent, and honest. No lawyer is immune to
error, however, and some are guilty of serious misjudgments. When lawyers
allegedly err in the course of clients’ representations, or, worse, allegedly engage in deliberate misconduct, aggrieved clients may sue for professional negligence, commonly described as legal malpractice, or for breach of fiduciary
duty.1 A lawyer who treats a client dishonestly may face liability on either of
* Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Chicago, Illinois. J.D., University of Kansas; M.Ed., University of Nebraska, B.S., Fort Hayes University. The opinions expressed
here are the author’s alone.
1
Liability for legal malpractice generally requires a plaintiff to prove the existence of an
attorney-client relationship, giving rise to a duty of care on the lawyer’s part, breach of that
duty, proximate cause, and damages. In re Estate of Powell, 12 N.E.3d 14, 19 (Ill. 2014);
Sabin v. Ackerman, 846 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2014); Harris v. O’Connor, 842 N.W.2d 50,
54 (Neb. 2014). Breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice generally are separate causes
of action. Slovensky v. Friedman, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60, 72 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Stanley
v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 776 (Ct. App. 1995)). The elements of the causes of ac-
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these theories.2 Lawyers’ alleged dishonesty in their practices exposes them to
potential liability to third parties as well. For example, if a lawyer knowingly
and substantially assists or encourages a client’s wrongdoing, those who are
harmed by the client’s misconduct may sue the lawyer in tort for allegedly aiding and abetting the client’s misdeeds.3 Yet, while the potential consequences
of lawyers’ alleged dishonesty should be apparent, lawyers seldom consider
themselves at risk for liability based on fraud or misrepresentation arising out
of clients’ representations. This perspective probably traces, at least in part, to
common notions of litigation practice, where parties generally cannot base
fraud claims on opposing lawyers’ misrepresentations.4 Any comfort lawyers
derive from this impression, however, overlooks three key points. First, lawyers
may be sued for fraud or negligent misrepresentation by adversaries in litigation, as where, for example, they are alleged to have knowingly misrepresented
material facts in negotiations.5 Second, transactional practice is such that business lawyers are natural targets of fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims
by third parties based on alleged false statements and failures to disclose infor-

tion, however, are similar. Liability for breach of fiduciary duty requires a plaintiff to prove
“ ‘(1) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage
proximately caused by the breach.’ ” Id. (quoting Stanley, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 776); see also
Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Patrick Davis, P.C., 283 S.W.3d 786, 792–93 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Koger v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 28 S.W.3d 405, 411 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000)). Some states distinguish between legal malpractice claims based on alleged professional negligence, or a breach of the standard of care, and an alleged breach of fiduciary duty, sometimes described as a breach of the standard of conduct. See, e.g., Crist v. Loyacono,
65 So. 3d 837, 842 (Miss. 2011) (employing this terminology). Other states merge the causes
of action where the lawyer’s alleged misstep is both a breach of the standard of care and a
breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1997) (“If
the alleged breach can be characterized as both a breach of the standard of care (legal malpractice based on negligence) and a breach of a fiduciary obligation (constructive fraud),
then the sole claim is legal malpractice.”).
2
See, e.g., Charnay v. Cobert, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 471, 480–81, 481 n.12 (Ct. App. 2006) (stating that “billing for work not performed or performed by others with lower billing rates than
those charged constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty”); Capital Care Corp. v. Hunt, 847 A.2d
75, 84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“[A]n attorney who undertakes representation of a client owes
that client both a duty of competent representation and the highest duty of honesty, fidelity,
and confidentiality. An intentional misrepresentation to a client during any transaction where
an attorney represents that client is clearly a violation of that attorney’s duty of honesty.”)
(citation omitted).
3
See Frederico v. Maric, 226 P.3d 403, 405 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (listing elements of the
tort of aiding and abetting); Tensfeldt v. Haberman, 768 N.W.2d 641, 649 n.12 (Wis. 2009)
(same). See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting Clients’ Misconduct Under State Law, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 130 (2008) (exploring aiding and
abetting claims against lawyers).
4
Safeway Ins. Co. v. Guerrero, 106 P.3d 1020, 1029 (Ariz. 2005).
5
See, e.g., Slotkin v. Citizens Cas. Co. of N.Y., 614 F.2d 301, 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (reasoning
that jury reasonably could have found lawyer liable for fraud under New York law for misrepresenting the amount of insurance coverage available to settle the plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim).
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mation.6 Third, clients may sue their own lawyers for alleged fraud and misrepresentation in appropriate cases.7
In fact, fraud and misrepresentation are common theories of liability in
suits against lawyers by both clients and third parties.8 In 2012, for example,
the Cincinnati law firm of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP suffered a $12.6 million
judgment after a jury found the firm and one of its partners, Harvey Cohen, liable for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.9 Cohen had represented Douglas
Machine & Tool Co. in its sale to TurboCombustor Technology Inc.10 He allegedly knew of a Douglas Machine shareholder dispute that substantially lowered the company’s value but he did not disclose the dispute to TurboCombustor in connection with the sale.11 TurboCombustor alleged that it would not
have purchased Douglas Machine had it known of the shareholder dispute.12 In
addition to awarding compensatory damages, the jury found that Dinsmore &
Shohl was liable for punitive damages, but that aspect of the case was bifurcat-

6

See, e.g., Cromeans v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 69 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938–40 (W.D. Mo.
2014) (permitting the plaintiff to pursue a negligent misrepresentation claim against a law
firm for allegedly false statements in a bond offering); Farmers State Bank v. Huguenin, 469
S.E.2d 34, 36–37 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing summary judgment for lawyer on bank’s
claim that lawyer for borrower failed to disclose cloud on title to real estate to be used to secure loan); Taylor v. Riley, 336 P.3d 256, 272 (Idaho 2014) (permitting non-client’s suit
against lawyer based on allegedly false statements in an opinion letter); Hansen v. Anderson,
Wilmarth & Van Der Maaten, 630 N.W.2d 818, 827 (Iowa 2001) (permitting lawyer to sue
opposing counsel for indemnity based on falsified documents presented during the sale of a
business); Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi, No. Civ.A. 01-2595 BLS, 2004 WL 3019442, at
*11–21 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2004) (concluding that a law firm committed negligent
misrepresentation in issuing an opinion letter); JJJJ Walker, LLC v. Yollick, 447 S.W.3d
453, 459–73 (Tex. App. 2014) (concluding that a lawyer could be liable for fraud while acting as a bank’s agent).
7
See, e.g., Bryant v. Robledo, 938 So. 2d 413, 419 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (permitting fraud
claim against lawyer for lawyer’s attempt to obtain fees to represent an incompetent client);
Ratcliff v. Boydell, 674 So. 2d 272, 280 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that lawyer defrauded client by inflating value of structured settlement to obtain an excessive contingent
fee); Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCabe & Mack, LLP, 964 N.Y.S.2d 160, 163 (App. Div. 2013)
(holding that client stated fraud claim by alleging that lawyers said they had filed a motion
for default judgment when they had not done so and billed the client for preparing the phantom motion).
8
See RONALD E. MALLEN & ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, 1 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8:31 (2015
ed.) (“Fraud is a common claim, easy to allege, and often accompanied by other theories.”).
9
Jon Newberry, Law Firm Dinsmore & Shohl Hit with $12.6 Million Judgement,
CINCINNATI BUS. COURIER (Oct. 26, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati
/blog/2012/10/law-firm-dinsmore-shohl-hit-with.html; Nate Raymond, Dinsmore Hit with
$12.6 Mln Fraud Verdict, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreu
ters.com/Legal/News/2012/10_October/Dinsmore_hit_with_$12.6_mln_fraud_verdict.
10
Newberry, supra note 9; Raymond, supra note 9.
11
Newberry, supra note 9; Raymond, supra note 9.
12
Newberry, supra note 9; Raymond, supra note 9 (reporting TurboCombustor’s claim that
the undisclosed shareholders’ dispute lowered Douglas Machine’s value from $19 million to
$4 million).
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ed, and the firm confidentially settled with TurboCombustor before the jury
could reconvene to weigh punitive damages.13
Fraud and misrepresentation claims pose an array of challenges for targeted
law firms and lawyers. Fraud claims may support punitive damage awards in
cases where punitives would not otherwise be recoverable, or open the door to
discovery that a court might refuse if only the lawyer’s professional negligence
was in dispute.14 Because the presence of fraud normally is a question of fact,15
well-pleaded fraud claims are difficult for defendants to defeat at the motion to
dismiss stage. Similarly, “[a] claim for negligent misrepresentation is ordinarily
one for a jury, unless the undisputed facts are so clear as to permit only one
conclusion,”16 thus devaluing a motion to dismiss as a defense tactic in many
cases. Again, because fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are factintensive,17 a plaintiff may be able to avoid summary judgment, and by forcing
the defendant to contemplate the risk of trial, achieve a favorable settlement.
Fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are particularly valuable to plaintiffs who cannot establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship with a
lawyer-defendant because they avoid the general requirement of privity for liability based on professional negligence.18 First Ark. Bank & Trust v. Gill Elrod
Ragon Owen & Sherman, P.A.,19 is an illustrative case.
First Arkansas arose out of a failed attempt by a limited liability company
known as Dream Team to develop a residential subdivision called Belclaire.20
Dream Team formed a municipal improvement district to issue tax-free municipal bonds to finance streets, sewers, and other public improvements in

13

Kimball Perry, Dinsmore Settles Second Half of $12.6M Suit, CINCINNATI.COM (Nov. 26,
2012, 3:35 PM), http://www.cincinnati.com/article/20121126/news0107/311260075.
14
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is
also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.”); 1 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note
8, § 23:6 (explaining that fraud is separate from legal malpractice and that the fraud is usually alleged to support a claim for punitive damages).
15
Chism v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 234 P.3d 780, 787 (Kan. 2010); Croslin v. Enerlex, Inc.,
308 P.3d 1041, 1046 (Okla. 2013).
16
Nota Constr. Corp. v. Keyes Assocs., Inc., 694 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
17
See St. Louis v. Wilkinson Law Offices, P.C., 55 A.3d 443, 447 (Me. 2012) (“Whether a
party made a misrepresentation and whether the opposing party justifiably relied on a misrepresentation are questions of fact.”).
18
See, e.g., Fortress Credit Corp. v. Dechert LLP, 934 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121–22 (App. Div.
2011) (concluding that the plaintiffs’ professional negligence claim failed for a lack of privity but finding that the plaintiffs could maintain a negligent misrepresentation claim against
the law firm based on relationship of near-privity before exonerating the firm); Ginsburg
Dev. Cos., LLC v. Carbone, 926 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157–58 (App. Div. 2011) (noting that legal
malpractice allegations predicated on fraud avoid the privity requirement); Credit Union
Cent. Falls v. Groff, 966 A.2d 1262, 1271 (R.I. 2009) (“Fraud is a well-settled exception to
the privity requirement that historically bars nonclient recovery for attorney malpractice.”).
19
427 S.W.3d 47 (Ark. 2013).
20
Id. at 49.
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Belclaire.21 The district hired Christopher Travis of the Gill law firm as bond
counsel. Travis prepared the preliminary official statement (“POS”) and official
statement (“OS”) that were provided to the underwriter, American Municipal
Securities, Inc. (“AMS”), for use in marketing the bonds.22 The district issued
two series of bonds, Series A and Series B. The Series B bonds were backed by
a mortgage on land in Belclaire that Dream Team owned and by capital use improvement fees that Dream Team was to collect.23 The POS and OS did not
identify a prior mortgage held by First Federal Bank securing the loan used to
purchase the land for Belclaire.24 AMS sold the Series B bonds to Arkansas
Banker’s Bank, which retained some and sold the remainder to other banks.25
Dream Team defaulted on payment of the capital use improvement fees
and on the First Federal mortgage.26 The banks that purchased the Series B
bonds sued the Gill firm for legal malpractice, violations of the Arkansas Securities Act, and fraud. They alleged that Travis failed to disclose in the bond offering that the First Federal mortgage was superior to the lien created by the
capital improvement use fees obligation.27 The priority of the First Federal
mortgage allegedly devalued the banks’ Series B bonds.28 The Gill firm obtained summary judgment on all counts and the banks appealed to the Arkansas
Supreme Court.29
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the Gill firm
on the plaintiffs’ Arkansas Securities Act claims because the Gill firm was not
a seller of the bonds, did not control their sale, and did not materially aid in
their sale as required for liability under the Arkansas statute.30 The court also
affirmed summary judgment for the Gill firm on the plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim based on a lack of privity because the Gill firm was retained by the
district and had no attorney-client relationship with any of the plaintiffs.31
That left the plaintiffs’ fraud claim, because the Arkansas lawyer-immunity
statute requiring privity for legal malpractice liability contained an exception
for acts or omissions by lawyers constituting fraud or intentional misrepresentations.32 The court began its analysis by stating that to prove fraud, a plaintiff
had to show that: (1) the defendant made a false representation of material fact;
(2) the defendant knew the representation was false or that there was insuffi21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51–54.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 51–52.
Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 53 (quoting McDonald v. Pettus, 988 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Ark. 1999)).
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cient evidence upon which to make the representation; (3) the defendant intended to induce action or inaction by the plaintiff in reliance upon the representation; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and (5) the
plaintiff was damaged as a result.33
Here, the Gill firm admitted that it knew of the First Federal mortgage, but
argued that given the structure of the transaction, the mortgage was not information that might have assisted prospective purchasers in evaluating the risks
of buying the bonds and, therefore, was not a material fact that had to be disclosed in the POS or the OS.34 Conversely, the plaintiffs asserted that: (1) the
priority of the mortgage was material and, thus, the Gill firm had a duty to disclose it; (2) the Gill firm intentionally failed to disclose the First Federal mortgage and that had the mortgage been disclosed, the bond issue would not have
closed; and (3) the Gill firm’s failure to disclose the mortgage was done with
the intent to defraud purchasers of the bonds so as to secure the fees the Gill
firm expected to realize from the bond issue.35 The plaintiffs’ critical point was
that genuine issues of material fact remained, and thus the trial court erred by
awarding summary judgment to the Gill firm on the fraud claim.36 The First
Arkansas court agreed with the plaintiffs, reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment on the fraud count, and remanded the case for further proceedings.37
First Arkansas illuminates lawyers’ vulnerability to misrepresentation
claims and the difficulty they may encounter in defeating them short of trial. It
therefore nicely launches our examination of lawyers’ and law firms’ potential
civil liability for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Looking ahead, Part I
of this article provides an overview of the common law causes of action available to potential plaintiffs: (a) common law fraud, also described as actual fraud
or intentional misrepresentation; (b) fraudulent concealment; (c) constructive
fraud; and (d) negligent misrepresentation.38 After discussing these causes of
action, Part I examines the role that rules of professional conduct play in establishing a standard of care or conduct, or the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s reli33

Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 54. According to the Gill firm, if the Arkansas municipal improvement district statute is followed, any mortgages are subordinate to liens arising from related bonds. Thus, the
mortgage did not have to be disclosed because amounts due on the bonds from landowners
would have created a lien superior to the mortgage. This argument failed because genuine
issues of material fact remained in dispute. Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 54–55.
38
This article does not discuss lawyers’ civil liability under attorney deceit statutes. See,
e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 36-2-17 (West 2010) (“If an attorney is guilty of deceit or collusion
or consents thereto with intent to deceive the court, judge or party, he shall forfeit to the injured party, treble damages to be recovered in a civil action . . . .”); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 487
(McKinney 2005) (subjecting a lawyer who “[i]s guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party” to treble damages).
34
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ance on a lawyer’s alleged misrepresentations. Part II looks at four illustrative
negligent misrepresentation and fraud cases against lawyers; two arising out of
underlying litigation matters and two arising out of lawyers’ transactional practices. Part III offers lawyers some brief practical advice on avoiding potential
liability for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
I.

UNDERSTANDING FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION

Plaintiffs suing lawyers or law firms for alleged misrepresentations or
omissions may pursue several theories of recovery, including: (a) common law
fraud, also referred to as actual fraud or intentional misrepresentation; (b)
fraudulent concealment, also described as fraud by silence or silent fraud; (c)
constructive fraud; and (d) negligent misrepresentation. Depending on the case
and cause of action, plaintiffs may attempt to use rules of professional conduct
to define the standard of care or conduct against which a defendant’s duty is
measured, or establish key elements required for liability.
A. Common Law Fraud
As a California court once observed, “[a] fraud claim against a lawyer is no
different from a fraud claim against anyone else.”39 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts explains liability for common law fraud as follows:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused
to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.40

A misrepresentation may be either oral or written.41
Under the Restatement approach, a listener’s reliance on a misrepresentation is justifiable only if the matter misrepresented is material.42 Many courts
that generally follow the Restatement, however, treat materiality as an element
separate from reliance.43 Either way, a matter is deemed to be material if (1) a
reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or absence in determining how or whether to act in the subject transaction; or (2) the maker
knows or has reason to know that the recipient regards or is likely to regard the
matter as important in determining a course of action even though a reasonable
person would not so consider it.44
With respect to justifiable or reasonable reliance, the person to whom a
fraudulent misrepresentation is made is generally entitled to rely on the misrepresentation even if she might have learned that it was false through investiga39
40
41
42
43
44

Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 31 (Ct. App. 2004).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
Freedman v. Brutzkus, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 374 (Ct. App. 2010).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
See infra notes 50–51, 54–56.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).

16 NEV. L.J. 57, RICHMOND - FINAL.DOCX

1/15/16 1:34 PM

64

[Vol. 16:57

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

tion.45 As a rule, a party has no duty to investigate the truthfulness of a representation and may justifiably or reasonably rely on a representation so long as
the party does not know it to be false or it is not obviously false.46
The base question, of course, is what makes a misrepresentation fraudulent? Section 526 explains that a misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker:
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not
have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he
states or implies.47

Courts frequently describe this element of a defendant’s conduct as scienter.48
The maker’s scienter is critical to a finding of fraud.49 The existence of scienter
is a question of fact.50
Common law fraud has no all-encompassing or uniform definition or description.51 A cause of action for fraud certainly has essential elements as outlined in section 525, although some jurisdictions that have embraced the Restatement describe or list those elements in different ways. For example, Idaho
courts hold that fraud has nine elements:
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker’s knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker’s intent that there be reliance;
(6) the hearer’s ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the
hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury.52

45

Id. § 541.
Donner v. Nicklaus, 778 F.3d 857, 870 (10th Cir. 2015) (applying Utah law);
Yazdianpour v. Safeblood Techs., Inc., 779 F.3d 530, 536–37 (8th Cir. 2015) (applying Arkansas law and distinguishing affirmative misrepresentations from failures to disclose); Hoyt
Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 736 N.W.2d 313, 321 (Minn. 2007). See also Jane
Doe 43C v. Diocese of New Ulm, 787 N.W.2d 680, 685 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining
that “a party is under no duty to investigate a fraud it has no reason to suspect”). Cf. Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc. v. Venus, 66 So. 3d 306, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(explaining that fraud does not include a justifiable reliance element because a hearer may
rely on the truth of a representation even if the falsity of the representation could have been
discovered through reasonable investigation).
47
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
48
See, e.g., Dier v. Peters, 815 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2012) (“The knowledge of falsity element
of a fraud claim is also commonly known as the scienter element.”).
49
Butler v. Harris, 13 N.E.3d 380, 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); Weston v. Northampton Personal Care, Inc., 62 A.3d 947, 960 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
50
Meecorp Capital Mkts., LLC v. PSC of Two Harbors, LLC, 776 F.3d 557, 565 (8th Cir.
2015) (applying Minnesota law).
51
Mancuso v. Burton Farm Dev. Co. LLC, 748 S.E.2d 738, 749 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Forbis v. Neal, 649 S.E.2d 382, 387 (N.C. 2007)); Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 342
(Tenn. 2012).
52
April Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell, 328 P.3d 480, 489 (Idaho 2014) (quoting Bank of
Commerce v. Jefferson Enters., LLC, 303 P.3d 183, 192 (Idaho 2013)).
46
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Mississippi, Missouri, Utah, and Washington courts also list nine elements and
describe them similarly.53
Other jurisdictions reduce a cause of action for common law fraud to four,
five, or six elements. Connecticut, for example, lists four elements: “(1) a false
representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) the statement was untrue
and known to be so by its maker; (3) the statement was made with the intent of
inducing reliance thereon; and (4) the other party relied on the statement to his
detriment.”54 Florida similarly lists four elements.55 Alaska, California, Delaware, Illinois, and New York courts, among others, identify five elements,
which, while varying slightly in description, generally are: (1) misrepresentation of an existing material fact; (2) made with knowledge of its falsity; (3) the
speaker’s intent that the listener rely on the statement; (4) justifiable reliance by
the listener; and (5) resulting damages.56 Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Texas consider common law fraud to have six elements.57 With slight variation, those states require proof that: (1) the defendant
made a material representation; (2) the representation was false; (3) the representation was known to be false or was recklessly made; (4) the representation
was intended to induce the plaintiff to act; (5) the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation; and (6) the plaintiff was damaged as a result.58
53

See, e.g., Kinney v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc., 142 So. 3d 407, 418 (Miss. 2014)
(quoting Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, 18 So. 3d 814, 831 (Miss. 2009)); Stander v.
Szabados, 407 S.W.3d 73, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); Carlton v. Brown, 323 P.3d 571, 581–82
(Utah 2014) (quoting Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 201 P.3d 966, 977 n.38 (Utah
2009)); Alexander v. Sanford, 325 P.3d 341, 366 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Stiley v.
Block, 925 P.2d 194, 204 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)).
54
Reville v. Reville, 93 A.3d 1076, 1087 (Conn. 2014) (quoting Weinstein v. Weinstein,
882 A.2d 53, 63 (Conn. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55
Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 108 So. 3d 587, 595 n.2 (Fla. 2013).
56
Taylor v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 301 P.3d 182, 191 (Alaska 2013) (quoting Asher v.
Alkan Shelter, LLC, 212 P.3d 772, 782 (Alaska 2009)); State ex rel. Wilson v. Super. Ct.,
174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 333 n.21 (Ct. App. 2014) (describing the tort of “deceit”); Vichi v.
Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V., 85 A.3d 725, 773 (Del. Ch. 2014); Bonhomme v. St.
James, 970 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. 2012); Neckles Builders, Inc. v. Turner, 986 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497
(App. Div. 2014) (quoting Introna v. Huntington Learning Ctrs., Inc., 911 N.Y.S.2d 442, 445
(App. Div. 2010)).
57
Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc., 997 N.E.2d 327, 335 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Lawyers Title
Ins. Corp. v. Pokraka, 595 N.E.2d 244, 249 (Ind. 1992)); Elendt v. Green Tree Servicing,
LLC, 443 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014); Lucas v. Awaad, 830 N.W.2d 141, 152
(Mich. Ct. App. 2013); Bott v. Holman, 850 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Neb. Ct. App. 2014); Weston
v. Northampton Pers. Care, Inc., 62 A.3d 947, 960 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (quoting Heritage
Surveyors & Eng’rs, Inc. v. Nat’l Penn Bank, 801 A.2d 1248, 1250–51 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002)); Landers v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 434 S.W.3d 291, 293–94 (Tex. App. 2014)
(quoting Aquaplex, Inc. v. Rancho La Valencia, Inc., 297 S.W.3d 768, 774 (Tex. App.
2009)).
58
Kesling, 997 N.E.2d at 335 (quoting Lawyers Title, 595 N.E.2d at 249); Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 348 S.W.3d 729, 747 (Ky. 2011); Lucas, 830 N.W.2d at 152;
Bott, 850 N.W.2d at 807; Weston, 62 A.3d at 960 (quoting Heritage Surveyors & Eng’rs,
Inc., 801 A.2d at 1250–51); Landers, 434 S.W.3d at 293–94 (quoting Aquaplex, Inc., 297
S.W.3d at 774).
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Some aspects of common law fraud transcend jurisdictional boundaries but
reduce to the principle that the cause of action is disfavored. First, outside the
context of constructive fraud,59 fraud is never presumed,60 nor is it lightly inferred.61 To the contrary, courts presume a defendant’s honesty and innocence.62 Second, plaintiffs generally must plead fraud with particularity.63 A
plaintiff’s failure to specifically plead in her complaint or petition the acts or
facts allegedly evidencing fraud generally justifies dismissal of the case.64
Third, plaintiffs typically must prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence.65
“Clear and convincing evidence is such a high standard that even the over-

59

See infra Part II.C.
Byrd v. Lamar, 846 So. 2d 334, 343 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Wilson v. S. Med. Ass’n, 547
So. 2d 510, 514 (Ala. 1989)); Slaick v. Arnold, 728 S.E.2d 782, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012);
Fisher v. Grove Farm Co., Inc., 230 P.3d 382, 403 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Shoppe v.
Gucci Am., Inc., 14 P.3d 1049, 1067 (Haw. 2000)); Chism v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 234
P.3d 780, 787 (Kan. 2010); Harmony Glob. Sourcing, LLC v. Stigliano, No. L-003621-05,
2009 WL 2461262, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 13, 2009); Anderson v. Zimbelman, 842 N.W.2d 852, 857 (N.D. 2014) (quoting First Union Nat’l Bank v. RPB 2, LLC,
674 N.W.2d 1, 8 (N.D. 2004)); Bowman v. Presley, 212 P.3d 1210, 1218 (Okla. 2009); Law
Capital, Inc. v. Kettering, 836 N.W.2d 642, 647 (S.D. 2013); Homestead Grp., LLC. v. Bank
of Tenn., 307 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); Priddy v. Rawson, 282 S.W.3d 588,
598 (Tex. App. 2009); White v. Shane Edeburn Constr., LLC, 285 P.3d 949, 957 (Wyo.
2012) (quoting Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 870 P.2d 382, 383 (Wyo. 1994)).
61
Law Capital, Inc., 836 N.W.2d at 647.
62
Bowens v. Allied Warehousing Servs., Inc., 729 S.E.2d 845, 851–52 (W. Va. 2012) (quoting Hunt v. Hunt, 114 S.E. 283, 285 (W. Va. 1922)); White, 285 P.3d at 957 (quoting Osborn, 870 P.2d at 383).
63
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”).
64
See, e.g., Decker v. Nagel Rice LLC, No. 09 Civ. 9878(SAS), 2010 WL 2346608, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2010) (dismissing client’s fraud claim against lawyer for failure to plead
facts allegedly constituting fraud with particularity).
65
See, e.g., In re Estate of Nethken, 978 A.2d 603, 607 (D.C. 2009); Frontier Dev. Grp.,
LLC v. Caravella, 338 P.3d 1193, 1198 (Idaho 2014); Hanson-Suminksi v. Rohrman Midwest Motors, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 194, 202 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Chism, 234 P.3d at 787; Barr v.
Dyke, 49 A.3d 1280, 1286 (Me. 2012); Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ray, 997 So. 2d 983, 991
(Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Hamilton v. McGill, 352 So. 2d 825, 831 (Miss. 1977));
Stander v. Szabados, 407 S.W.3d 73, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Kempton v. Dugan,
224 S.W.3d 83, 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)); Bott v. Holman, 850 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Neb. Ct.
App. 2014); Harmony Glob. Sourcing, LLC, 2009 WL 2461262, at *3; Anderson, 842
N.W.2d at 857 (quoting First Union Nat’l Bank, 674 N.W.2d at 8); Bowman, 212 P.3d at
1218; Rohm & Haas Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 781 A.2d 1172, 1179 (Pa. 2001); In re Estate of
Alden v. Dee, 35 A.3d 950, 961 (Vt. 2011); Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, 737 S.E.2d 640,
653 (W. Va. 2012); White, 285 P.3d at 957 (quoting Osborn, 870 P.2d at 383). But see Benton v. Clay, 123 So. 3d 212, 219 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (stating that fraud need only be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence); Sejnoha v. City of Yankton, 622 N.W.2d 735, 739
(S.D. 2001) (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to fraud).
60
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whelming weight of the evidence does not rise to the same level.”66 Fourth, the
failure of any one element of the cause of action will defeat a fraud claim.67
When considering lawyers’ potential liability for fraud, perhaps the most
surprising thing is the Restatement’s position that fraud may be predicated on a
statement of opinion.68 Indeed, even a cursory review of case law will reveal
ample recent authority holding that a statement of opinion will not support a
cause of action for fraud.69 Merrilees v. Merrilees70 illustrates this principle in
the context of law practice.
Merrilees arose out of the divorce of Robert and Pamela Merrilees, which
began in 2005. In 1999, Robert had formed Spot Trading LLC (“Spot”).71 Although the Merrilees were married in 1993, Robert argued in the dissolution
proceedings that Spot was not marital property and further asserted that his distributions from Spot adequately compensated the marital estate.72 In 2009, the
Merrilees negotiated a marital settlement agreement that (a) allocated to Pamela
$18 million and the couple’s $1 million home, tax free; and (b) allocated Spot
to Robert.73 The agreement recited that the Merrilees had disputed Spot’s value,
but stated that Pamela had been advised by her own expert on Spot’s value,
stated that she was satisfied with that valuation, and provided that she disclaimed any interest in Spot.74 The trial court approved the agreement and incorporated it into the judgment for dissolution of the marriage.75
In 2010, Pamela sued Robert and his lawyers on various theories, including
fraud, alleging that they had understated Spot’s value and falsely informed her
that Spot was not marital property.76 Her fraud claim rested on three documents
that Robert’s lawyers gave her in the divorce case: an asset list, a memorandum
66

Moran v. Fairley, 919 So. 2d 969, 975 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Nash v. Studdard, 670 S.E.2d 508, 513 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Butler v. Terminix
Int’l, Inc., 334 S.E.2d 865, 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)); Morgan Stanley Credit Corp. v. Fillinger, 979 N.E.2d 362, 368 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012); Allegro, Inc. v. Scully, 762 S.E.2d 54, 68
(S.C. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp., 691 S.E.2d 135, 149
(S.C. 2010)); Parsons v. Greenberg, No. 02-10-00131-CV, 2012 WL 310505, at *10 (Tex.
App. Feb. 2, 2012); In re Estate of Alden, 35 A.3d 950, 961 (Vt. 2011).
68
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
69
See, e.g., RHA Constr., Inc. v. Scott Eng’g, Inc., C.A. N11C-03-013 JRJ CCLD, 2013
WL 3884937, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 24, 2013); Burds v. Hipes, 763 S.E.2d 887, 889
(Ga. Ct. App. 2014); Ill. Non-Profit Risk Mgmt. Ass’n v. Human Serv. Ctr. of S. Metro-East,
884 N.E.2d 700, 710 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Flegles, Inc. v. TruServ Corp., 289 S.W.3d 544,
549 (Ky. 2009) (quoting McHargue v. Fayette Coal & Feed Co., 283 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Ky.
1955)); Lasater v. Guttmann, 5 A.3d 79, 103 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); Heath v. Palmer,
915 A.2d 1290, 1296 (Vt. 2006); Sales v. Kecoughtan Housing Co., Ltd., 690 S.E.2d 91, 94
(Va. 2010).
70
Merrilees v. Merrilees, 998 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
71
Id. at 153.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 153–54.
74
Id. at 154.
75
Id.
76
Id.
67
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explaining Robert’s position, and a flow chart.77 The trial court dismissed her
case in its entirety and she fared just as badly on appeal.78 The appellate court
easily dispatched her fraud claim, first reasoning that the allegedly false documents “were expressions of opinion and were given to support Robert’s positions during settlement negotiations in the divorce case.”79 Because she could
“not identify any misstatements of material fact on which she reasonably relied,” the Merrilees court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Robert’s lawyers.80
The plaintiff’s fraud claim also failed in Cain v. Osman.81 The lawyer in
that case, Ronald Osman, declined to pursue a qui tam action against General
American Life Insurance Co. on behalf of a podiatrist, John Cain, telling Cain
that he “did not believe” Cain had “a viable action under the False Claims
Act.”82 Then, a few months later, Osman sued General American for similar
misconduct on behalf of two other relators, Harry and Nancy Riggs, and the
three of them were rewarded when the government intervened in the action and
obtained a $70 million settlement.83 An outraged Cain sued Osman on various
theories, including fraud, alleging that Osman had used information he provided to pursue the Riggs’ case.84 The district court dismissed the case and Cain
appealed to the Seventh Circuit.85
Cain contended that the district court had erred in dismissing his fraud
claim by not recognizing that he had alleged a false statement of material fact:
Osman’s representation that he did not believe that Cain had a “viable action
under the False Claims Act.”86 The Seventh Circuit rejected Cain’s argument
on the basis that in declining to represent him, Osman had offered “a legal
opinion, not a representation of fact.”87 In the end, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court’s judgment for Osman across the board.88
Notwithstanding the results in Merrilees and Cain, the general rule that
mere statements of opinion and statements of legal opinion will not support
fraud allegations is subject to several qualifications or exceptions. First, the
general rule may not apply because what is claimed to be a statement of opin-

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 158.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 159.
Cain v. Osman, 286 F. App’x 934 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 936 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 938.
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ion may actually be a misrepresentation of fact.89 “A fact is something ‘susceptible of knowledge.’ ”90 For example, while “a representation of law is a statement of opinion as to what the law permits or prohibits” and will not support a
fraud claim, “[a] statement concerning the law is a misrepresentation of fact if
it involves ‘statements that imply the existence of accurate and readily ascertainable facts that either concern the law or have legal significance, but which
are not part of the law themselves.’ ”91 Or, as a Minnesota court more succinctly
stated, while “abstract statements of law or pure legal opinions are not actionable [as fraud], statements of law that imply knowledge of facts are actionable.”92
Second, a lawyer who offers a knowingly false legal opinion may commit
fraud.93 Such cases are understandably rare because lawyers seldom have reason to furnish knowingly false legal opinions, although it is conceivable that a
lawyer who is desperate to tell a client what it wants to hear to attract or retain
business, or who is hoping to conceal some error or misconduct, might resort to
such dishonesty.94
Third, there is a “relationship exception” to the general rule, which applies
where: (a) the parties are in a fiduciary relationship; (b) the maker of the allegedly false statement is a lawyer and the circumstances required her to divulge
all the information she had to the plaintiff; or (c) the maker of the allegedly
false statement is a lawyer and knows that the plaintiff was relying on her “as
one learned in the law.”95 As the Alabama Supreme Court explained in discussing the relationship exception, “a client who asks the opinion of his attorney on
89

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (explaining
when statements of law constitute statements of opinion and when they constitute statements
of fact).
90
Zimmerman v. Kent, 575 N.E.2d 70, 75 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (quoting three Massachusetts cases).
91
Brodeur v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 169 P.3d 139, 153 (Colo. 2007) (quoting Equal
Justice Found. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Am., 412 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795–96 (S.D. Ohio
2005)).
92
Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 716 N.W.2d 366, 372–73 (Minn. Ct. App.
2006), aff’d, 736 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 2007).
93
See, e.g., Green v. White, 494 S.E.2d 681, 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (involving a lawyer
who allegedly knew that he gave his client inaccurate advice and did not inform the client);
Brownell v. Garber, 503 N.W.2d 81, 87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (determining that the plaintiff
stated a cause of action for fraud by alleging that his divorce lawyer knew that a property
settlement would have adverse tax consequences at the time he recommended it while representing otherwise, or never analyzed the tax aspects of the property settlement notwithstanding his representations to the contrary); Rice v. Heilbronner, 708 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (App.
Div. 2000) (concluding that the “[p]laintiffs’ allegations that [the lawyer] expressed an opinion that he did not believe to be true and made such statement with an intent to deceive
[were] sufficient to state a cause of action for fraud”).
94
See, e.g., Encinias v. Whitener Law Firm, P.A., 310 P.3d 611, 620 (N.M. 2013) (recognizing fraud claim against lawyer who allegedly told client that statute of limitations had not
run when it had).
95
Brodeur, 169 P.3d at 154.
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a point of law may assume that the attorney has special knowledge of the law
and is entitled to a[n] honest opinion from him on which the client may justifiably rely.”96
Finally, there is a “superior knowledge” or “special knowledge” exception
to the general rule.97 It applies where a party to a transaction with superior
knowledge about the subject of the transaction or an aspect of it opines on an
issue material to the transaction.98 A lawyer’s allegedly false statements to an
unrepresented non-lawyer are the paradigmatic case for application of this exception.99
B. Fraudulent Concealment
In some instances, a dishonest defendant’s potential liability pivots not on a
false statement of material fact, but on the alleged failure to disclose a key fact.
Here, the cause of action is fraudulent concealment.100 Fraudulent concealment
is simply another form of common law fraud.101 It is sometimes referred to as
“fraud by silence,”102 or “silent fraud.”103 To establish fraudulent concealment,
a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to disclose a material fact; (2) the defendant failed to do so; (3) the defendant intended to defraud or deceive the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff acted in justifiable reli-

96

Lawson v. Cagle, 504 So. 2d 226, 227 (Ala. 1987); see also Encinias, 310 P.3d at 620
(“[I]t is reasonable for clients to assume that they can rely on their attorneys’ legal advice.”).
97
Brodeur, 169 P.3d at 154; GJP, Inc. v. Ghosh, 251 S.W.3d 854, 889–90 (Tex. App. 2008).
98
Brodeur, 169 P.3d at 154; Merrilees v. Merrilees, 998 N.E.2d 147, 160 (Ill. App. Ct.
2013). See, e.g., Boyles Bros. Drilling Co. v. Orion Indus., Ltd., 761 P.2d 278, 282 (Colo.
App. 1988) (“The alleged misrepresentation here was as to the legal effect of words used in
the indorsement [sic] and assignment. It was made by an attorney to a layman and goes to
the very essence of the agreement between the parties.”).
99
See, e.g., Boyles Bros., 761 P.2d at 282 (involving a lawyer’s statements to a layman;
whether the layman was represented by counsel and thus could not claim reasonable reliance
was a question of fact).
100
See PNC Multifamily Capital Inst. Fund XXVI Ltd. P’ship v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev.
Corp., 387 S.W.3d 525, 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“A party commits fraudulent concealment for failing to disclose a known fact or condition where he or she had a duty to disclose
and another party reasonably relies upon the resulting misrepresentation, thereby suffering
injury.”).
101
See Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 332
(Ct. App. 2008) (“Concealment is a species of fraud or deceit.”); Graphic Comm. Loc. 1B
Health & Welfare Fund “A” v. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 695 (Minn. 2014)
(“Under the common law, a party may be liable for fraud either by making an affirmative
statement that is false or by concealing or not disclosing facts under certain circumstances.”);
Hodges v. Rajpal, 459 S.W.3d 237, 246 n.11 (Tex. App. 2015) (describing fraudulent concealment as a subcategory of common law fraud).
102
See, e.g., Stechschulte v. Jennings, 298 P.3d 1083, 1097 (Kan. 2013) (listing the elements
of the tort).
103
See, e.g., Barclae v. Zarb, 834 N.W.2d 100, 115–16 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (describing
the tort this way).
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ance on the concealment; and (5) the plaintiff was damaged as a result.104 As
with common law fraud, fraudulent concealment allegations are subject to
heightened pleading requirements, and a plaintiff generally must establish
fraudulent concealment through clear and convincing evidence.105
The existence of a duty to disclose on the defendant’s part is the threshold
inquiry in a fraudulent concealment case.106 A duty to disclose may be either
legal or equitable,107 and may arise “where the parties have a relation of trust
and confidence or where there is inequality of condition and knowledge, or
where there are other attendant circumstances.”108
Obviously, the defendant must know of the subject fact to have a duty to
disclose it.109 More particularly, the defendant must have actual knowledge of
the fact; it is not enough that the defendant should have known of the fact or
might have discovered it, or that knowledge of the fact might be imputed to the
defendant.110
Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis, & Pogue111 is an interesting fraudulent concealment case against a law firm. Vega arose out of Transmedia Asia Pacific,
Inc.’s merger with Monsterbook.com. Jones Day represented Transmedia,
while Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe represented Monsterbook.112 Plaintiff Frank Vega owned common stock in Monsterbook.com and his shares were
exchanged in the merger for shares of Transmedia restricted stock.113
In March 2000, Transmedia agreed to acquire Monsterbook in a stock deal
that valued Monsterbook at $15 million.114 Shortly after execution of the merger agreement, but before closing, Transmedia agreed to issue $10 million in
“toxic” convertible preferred stock to a third party.115 Although the toxicity of
the preferred stock is not explained in the opinion, it had the effect of diluting
the value of the shares of Transmedia stock held by all other Transmedia shareholders, including Vega.116
Following Transmedia’s commitment to issue the convertible preferred
stock, Jones Day prepared and sent to Heller Ehrman, for execution by the
104

Blondell v. Littlepage, 991 A.2d 80, 94 (Md. 2010) (quoting Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
916 A.2d 257, 274 (Md. 2007)).
105
Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 82 A.3d 101, 102 (Me. 2013).
106
Blondell, 991 A.2d at 93.
107
Barr v. Dyke, 49 A.3d 1280, 1287 (Me. 2012); Lucas v. Awaad, 830 N.W.2d 141, 152
(Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
108
Hobson v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 432 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014).
109
PNC Multifamily Capital Inst. Fund XXVI Ltd. P’ship v. Bluff City Cmty. Dev. Corp.,
387 S.W.3d 525, 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
110
Jehly v. Brown, 327 P.3d 351, 353–55 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).
111
17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Ct. App. 2004).
112
Id. at 29.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
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Monsterbook shareholders, a form seeking written consent to Transmedia’s issuance of the preferred stock.117 The form reflected the initial conversion rate
of the preferred stock, but it did not reflect the toxic anti-dilution provisions,
instead referring to a certificate to be filed with the Delaware Secretary of State
that would reflect the deal’s complete terms.118 Meanwhile, in connection with
the Delaware Secretary of State filing, Jones Day prepared a disclosure schedule that “clearly described and properly disclosed” the toxic aspect of the thirdparty investment, but did not share that schedule with Heller Ehrman, allegedly
because doing so would have killed the merger.119 In sum, Jones Day prepared
two versions of a disclosure schedule relating to the convertible preferred stock
for inclusion with the merger agreement, but sent only the unrevealing one to
Heller Ehrman.120
Later that month, Transmedia filed the certificate with respect to the convertible preferred stock with the Secretary of State of Delaware and closed the
preferred stock financing.121 Heller Ehrman apparently never requested a copy
of the certificate from Jones Day or from the Delaware Secretary of State.122 In
April 2000, Transmedia completed its acquisition of Monsterbook and Monsterbook’s former common stockholders thus became common stockholders of
Transmedia.123 Vega, however, did not learn of the full terms of the convertible
preferred stock transaction until December 2000.124
Vega sued Jones Day in California state court for negligent misrepresentation and fraud.125 With respect to the fraud claim, the key issue was Jones
Day’s allegedly active concealment or suppression of material facts.126 The trial
court dismissed Vega’s case on Jones Day’s demurrer and Vega appealed.127
As the appellate court summarized Vega’s fraudulent concealment theory,
“Jones Day hid the existence of the ‘toxic’ stock provisions with the intent to
induce Vega to give up his valuable stock in Monsterbook in exchange for
Transmedia’s . . . worthless stock.”128 Jones Day deliberately concealed the toxic stock provisions by failing to provide proper written disclosure, and by in-

117

Id.
Id. at 30, 35.
119
Id. at 29.
120
Id. at 29–30.
121
Id. at 30.
122
Id. at 29–30, 33.
123
Id. at 30.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 29.
126
See id. at 32 (discussing the elements of fraud and the active concealment or suppression
of material facts as the equivalent of a false statement).
127
Id. at 31; Demurrer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that a demurrer is the equivalent of a motion to dismiss a case for failing to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted).
128
Vega, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 31.
118
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stead providing a sanitized version of the disclosure.129 Vega purportedly lost
his $3.45 million interest in Monsterbook as a result.130
After observing that “[a] fraud claim against a lawyer is no different from a
fraud claim against anyone else,”131 and rejecting fraud liability against Jones
Day based on an allegedly false statement about the unremarkable nature of the
third-party transaction,132 the court turned to Jones Day’s fraud based on nondisclosure:
More problematic, however, is the question of active concealment or suppression of facts, which is the equivalent of a false representation. Vega alleges that
Jones Day, after telling Heller Ehrman that Transmedia was about to close a
$ 10 million private stock transaction which it wanted to include in its disclosure
schedules, prepared a proper disclosure schedule containing the pertinent terms,
but provided a “different sanitized version” of the schedule, without the “toxic”
stock provisions. Thus, Vega alleges that Jones Day “deliberately or with a reckless disregard of the truth concealed the ‘toxic’ stock provisions” from Vega,
Monsterbook and Heller Ehrman. These allegations state an “active concealment
or suppression of facts.”133

Jones Day argued that liability for fraudulent concealment requires the defendant to have a duty to disclose the suppressed fact, and that as Transmedia’s
counsel, it had no duty to disclose the terms of the third-party investment to
Monsterbook, its shareholders, or Heller Ehrman.134 Thus, its failure to share
the complete disclosure schedule was “entirely irrelevant.”135 The Vega court
disagreed, reasoning that Jones Day specifically undertook to disclose the thirdparty transaction and, having done so, could not conceal a material term.136
Even if no duty to disclose otherwise exists, “where one does speak he must
speak the whole truth to the end that he does not conceal any facts which materially qualify those stated.”137 Although Jones Day owed no professional duty
of care to Vega as an adverse party in a merger, it did have a duty “not to defraud another, even if that other [was] [Heller Ehrman] negotiating at arm’s
length.”138 Ultimately, the court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Vega’s
complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings.139
Business lawyers might well argue that the Vega court erred in ruling as it
did. The disclosure schedules were Transmedia’s, not Jones Day’s. There could
129

Id.
Id. at 29.
131
Id. at 31.
132
Id. at 32.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 33.
135
Id. (quoting Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue’s brief).
136
Id.
137
Id. (quoting Cicone v. URS Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 887, 891 (Ct. App. 1986)).
138
Id. at 34 (quoting Shafer v. Berger, Khan, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone,
131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 790 (Ct. App. 2003)).
139
Id. at 39.
130
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have been no active concealment of the preferred stock transaction when the
transaction’s terms were available from the Delaware Secretary of State and a
Jones Day lawyer had apparently told a Heller Ehrman lawyer that Transmedia
was “about to close a private stock financing” that was not listed in the Transmedia’s disclosure schedules before the preferred stock deal closed.140 If Heller
Ehrman: (a) failed to follow up on the telephone alert to the third-party financing; (b) failed to obtain the certificate from the Delaware Secretary of State; or
(c) did not request a copy of the certificate and any related documents from
Transmedia before permitting the Transmedia-Monsterbook transaction to
close, then it was Heller Ehrman that should have been in Vega’s crosshairs—
not Jones Day.
But even if all those arguments resonate with practicing lawyers, it is understandable that the Vega court would hold as it did. To start, the case came to
it on an appeal from a demurrer. The court thus assumed all well-pleaded facts
in Vega’s complaint to be true and applied a de novo standard of review to determine whether the complaint stated a cause of action on any theory.141 In
short, the standard of review strongly favored Vega. Although it is true that the
disclosure schedules were Transmedia’s and not Jones Day’s,142 the record reflected that Jones Day prepared them and, having prepared two versions, shared
only the supposedly innocent one with Heller Ehrman143—arguably because
sharing the schedule that included the preferred stock transaction would have
aborted the Transmedia-Monsterbook deal. The fact that Jones Day did so as
Transmedia’s agent did not absolve Jones Day of its own potential liability for
fraud.144 As for Jones Day’s argument that there could have been no fraudulent
concealment given the availability of the certificate and thus knowledge of the
preferred stock transaction through the Delaware Secretary of State, the court
disagreed, explaining that “[t]he mere fact that information exists somewhere in
the public domain is by no means conclusive” when debating fraudulent concealment.145 Finally, but critically, whether Jones Day concealed the contours
or terms of the preferred stock transaction to induce Vega to believe that the
transaction was immaterial, and whether the consent form stating that a certificate revealing the third-party investment and its terms would be filed in Delaware, effectively furnished Vega with the information to which he was entitled
were “questions of fact to be resolved on the evidence, not as a matter of law
on a demurrer.”146
140

Id. at 29 n.2.
Maslo v. Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins., 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 859 (Ct. App. 2014)
(quoting Kyablue v. Watkins, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156, 158 (Ct. App. 2012)).
142
Vega, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 29.
143
Id. at 30.
144
Shafer v. Berger, Khan, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d
777, 788–90 (Ct. App. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (AM. LAW INST.
2006).
145
Vega, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 35.
146
Id. at 35–36.
141
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C. Constructive Fraud
Unlike common law or actual fraud and fraud by concealment, which are
similar wrongs, constructive fraud is distinguished by the parties’ relationship.
Constructive fraud requires a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the
parties.147 A “confidential relationship” for constructive fraud purposes is a relationship in which one party reposes special trust and confidence in the other,
with the latter positioned to have and exercise influence over the first.148 An attorney-client relationship unquestionably satisfies the fiduciary or confidential
relationship requirement.149 On the other side of the coin, the absence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship is fatal to a constructive fraud claim,150 meaning that lawyers generally cannot be liable to third parties on this theory.151
Given lawyers’ duty of loyalty to their clients, courts are understandably unwilling to extend lawyers’ fiduciary duties to third parties.152
Constructive fraud does not require actual dishonesty or intent to deceive
by the alleged offender.153 Even innocent misrepresentations, negligent misrepresentations, or failures to disclose material facts will support constructive
fraud allegations.154 With constructive fraud, intent is inferred from the existence of the fiduciary or confidential relationship and its breach.155 In other
words, the element of scienter that characterizes fraud and fraudulent concealment is replaced in constructive fraud theory by a confidential or fiduciary relationship.156 The law describes the breach of a confidential or fiduciary relationship as fraud because of its tendency to deceive, to violate confidences, or to
injure public interests.157 Apart from the replacement of the element of scienter
with a confidential or fiduciary relationship, the other requirements for common law fraud liability remain in place.158

147

Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 854 (Ct. App.
2014) (quoting Michel v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 802 (Ct. App. 2007)).
148
Estate of Draper v. Bank of Am., N.A., 205 P.3d 698, 707 (Kan. 2009).
149
Sanders v. Townsend, 582 N.E.2d 355, 358 (Ind. 1991).
150
See, e.g., Petrello v. White, 412 F. Supp. 2d 215, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying New
York law).
151
See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 601–04 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that lawyers were not liable for constructive fraud to investors with whom they had no attorneyclient relationship).
152
Accident & Injury Med. Specialists, P.C. v. Mintz, 279 P.3d 658, 663 (Colo. 2012).
153
Hobson v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 432 S.W.3d 117, 123 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014); Hemphill v.
Shore, 289 P.3d 1173, 1182 (Kan. 2012); Eggleston v. Kovacich, 742 N.W.2d 471, 482
(Neb. 2007); Croslin v. Enerlex, Inc., 308 P.3d 1041, 1045–46 (Okla. 2013).
154
Croslin, 308 P.3d at 1046.
155
Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 150 P.3d 288, 294 (Idaho 2006).
156
Petrello v. White, 412 F. Supp. 2d 215, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying New York law).
157
Canaj, Inc. v. Baker & Div. Phase III, 893 A.2d 1067, 1095 (Md. 2006) (quoting Md.
Envtl. Trust v. Gaynor, 803 A.2d 512, 516–17 (Md. 2002)); Eggleston, 742 N.W.2d at 482.
158
Petrello, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 229 (discussing New York law).
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Constructive fraud also differs from common law or actual fraud in the allocation of the burden of proof. In a constructive fraud case, once the plaintiff
establishes the existence of a fiduciary relationship with the defendant, thus
making the challenged transaction presumptively fraudulent, the burden shifts
to the defendant to prove that he acted fairly and honestly in the affair.159 Or,
perhaps more precisely, the burden shifts to the defendant to defeat any one of
the remaining elements of the plaintiff’s constructive fraud claim and, in so doing, disprove the claim altogether.160 The defendant generally must do so by
clear and convincing evidence.161
If a plaintiff pleads both breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud
claims, there is a reasonable likelihood that a court will determine the causes of
action to be duplicative and dismiss one as superfluous, or submit only one of
them to the jury.162 That is not always the case, however, and it certainly is not
assured in jurisdictions where constructive fraud is distinguished from breach
of fiduciary duty by an additional requirement: that a defendant charged with
constructive fraud sought to gain some advantage or benefit through her position of trust.163 Fortunately for lawyers, the receipt of fees should not be treated
as a benefit that will support liability for constructive fraud.164 This is because a
lawyer’s fee generally can be divorced from conduct allegedly constituting
constructive fraud.165 In other words, a lawyer gains no advantage or benefit
through a fee paid to her in connection with a matter tainted by constructive
fraud because the lawyer would have earned a fee if she had acted properly in
the representation.166 By way of qualification, this reasoning seems to depend
159

Culhane v. Culhane, 969 F. Supp. 2d 210, 225 (D. Conn. 2013) (applying Connecticut
law); King v. Bryant, 737 S.E.2d 802, 809 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Collier v. Bryant,
719 S.E.2d 70, 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011)); Lee v. Hasson, 286 S.W.3d. 1, 21 (Tex. Ct. App.
2007); Grubb v. Grubb, 630 S.E.2d 746, 751 (Va. 2006).
160
Demming v. Underwood, 943 N.E.2d 878, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
161
Utzler v. Braca, 972 A.2d 743, 755 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (quoting Dunham v. Dunham,
528 A.2d 1123, 1134 (Conn. 1987), overruled in part on other grounds by Santopietro v.
New Haven, 682 A.2d 106, 109 n.8 (Conn. 1996)); Hassan v. Yusuf, 944 N.E.2d 895, 914
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Demming, 943 N.E.2d at 892; In re Jane Tiffany Living Trust 2001, 177
P.3d 1060, 1063 (Nev. 2008); Grubb, 630 S.E.2d at 751.
162
See In re Wayport, Inc. Litig., 76 A.3d 296, 327 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“On the facts of this
case, the breach of fiduciary duty count confronts directly the implications of the fiduciary
relationship, rendering the constructive fraud count redundant and superfluous.”).
163
See, e.g., Sheaff Brock Inv. Advisors, LLC v. Morton, 7 N.E.3d 278, 288 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014) (listing as an element of constructive fraud “the gaining of an advantage by the party
to be charged at the expense of the complaining party”); Dewey v. Stringer, 325 P.3d 1236,
1239–40 (Mont. 2014) (quoting Montana’s constructive fraud statute); Crumley & Assocs.,
P.C. v. Charles Peed & Assocs., P.A., 730 S.E.2d 763, 767 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“To establish constructive fraud, a plaintiff must show that defendant (1) owes plaintiff a fiduciary
duty; (2) breached this fiduciary duty; and (3) sought to benefit himself in the transaction.”).
164
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Parker, 535 S.E.2d 597, 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (citing
Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 488 S.E.2d 215, 224 (N.C. 1997)).
165
See id.
166
Id.
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on the lawyer’s fee not being inflated by the conduct allegedly constituting
constructive fraud.167
D. Negligent Misrepresentation
In addition to potential liability for some form of fraud, lawyers may be accused of negligent misrepresentation.168 Most jurisdictions have adopted the
definition of negligent misrepresentation set forth in section 552(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information,
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.169

Liability for negligent misrepresentation is principally distinguished from
liability for fraud by the defendant’s mental state.170 Negligent misrepresentation requires no intent to deceive by the defendant.171 The defendant need not
know that the statement in dispute is false;172 rather, a defendant need only be
careless or negligent in ascertaining the truth of the statement.173 Thus, a defendant may be liable for negligent misrepresentation where she acted with no
ill intent but failed to exercise the degree or level of care required under the circumstances.174
Negligent misrepresentation, like other forms of negligence, naturally
counts among its elements a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.175 This
167

See id. (“Allegations . . . are that defendant ‘took advantage of his position of trust and
benefit[t]ed . . . in that he was paid for his services in closing the subject loan transaction.’
There was no evidence that the amount paid defendant for notarizing and witnessing the loan
documents would have been any different if the documents had not been forged.”) (emphasis
added).
168
See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1564–68 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming a
judgment against a lawyer); Wafra Leasing Corp. v. Prime Capital Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d
852, 873–74 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (concluding that the plaintiff had stated a negligent misrepresentation claim against a lawyer based on statements in an opinion letter).
169
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
170
Jane Doe-3 v. McLean Cty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 973 N.E.2d 880, 889 (Ill.
2012); Zawaideh v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Regulation & Licensure, 825
N.W.2d 204, 212 (Neb. 2013).
171
Moncada v. W. Coast Quartz Corp., 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 601, 611 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting
Intrieri v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97, 108 (Ct. App. 2004)); Sundberg v. TTR Realty,
LLC, 109 A.3d 1123, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
172
Sundberg, 109 A.3d at 1131; Simmons v. Campion, 991 N.E.2d 924, 932 (Ill. App. Ct.
2013).
173
Jane Doe-3, 973 N.E.2d at 889.
174
Nelson v. Wardyn, 820 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012).
175
Sw. Non-Profit Hous. Corp. v. Nowak, 322 P.3d 204, 208 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); Bock v.
Hansen, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 302 (Ct. App. 2014); Simmons, Morris & Carroll, LLC v.
Capital One, N.A., 144 So. 3d 1207, 1215 (La. Ct. App. 2014); Williams v. Smith, 820
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duty is not boundless.176 It is not a duty to take every possible precaution
against misstatements, nor is it a duty to be right about the content or subject of
the representation; rather, it is the familiar duty to exercise reasonable care in
the circumstances.177
Liability for negligent misrepresentation is more limited than liability for
fraud.178 Section 552(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts specifies those
limits in general terms, stating that a defendant’s liability for negligent misrepresentation is restricted to losses suffered:
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends
to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.179

With respect to negligent misrepresentation claims against lawyers, plaintiffs usually are third parties.180 Clients seldom sue their lawyers for negligent
misrepresentation for the simple reason that they do not need the cause of action to vindicate their rights; ordinary professional negligence claims against
lawyers may be based on either conduct or alleged misrepresentations.181 But
while it is clear that third parties may sue lawyers for negligent misrepresentation, courts carefully define the classes of third parties to whom lawyers may
owe duties and, in so doing, limit the reach or scope of lawyers’ duties.182 This
attempt at precision is grounded in the recognition that whether a lawyer may
be held to owe a duty to a third party “depends on balancing the attorney’s duty
to represent clients vigorously . . . with the duty not to provide misleading information on which third parties foreseeably will rely.”183 As a result, a lawyer
may owe a duty to a third party for negligent misrepresentation purposes when:
(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a third party will rely on
N.W.2d 807, 815 (Minn. 2012); UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 94 A.3d 176, 191 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (quoting Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 A.2d 257, 273 (Md. 2007)).
176
See Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 302 P.3d 1148, 1153 (Nev. 2013) (explaining limits on liability for negligent misrepresentation).
177
Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. Richland Cty., 714 S.E.2d 869, 873–74 (S.C. 2011) (quoting
AMA Mgmt. Corp. v. Strasburger, 420 S.E.2d 868, 874 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992)).
178
Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 344 (Tenn. 2012).
179
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
180
See 1 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 8, § 7:34. See, e.g., Finova Capital Corp. v. Berger,
794 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (App. Div. 2005) (exonerating the lawyer because the plaintiff did
not rely on the alleged negligent misrepresentation in an opinion letter).
181
1 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 8, § 7:34.
182
See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605
N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1992) (limiting lawyers’ potential liability for negligent misrepresentation to cases where “there [is] either actual privity of contract . . . or a relationship so close
as to approach that of privity . . . in order to provide fair and manageable bounds to what
otherwise could prove to be limitless liability”).
183
Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1357 (N.J. 1995).
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her representation and the third party is not too remote from the lawyer to deserve protection;184 (2) the lawyer or her client (with the lawyer’s acquiescence)
“invites” a third party to rely on the lawyer’s opinion or delivery of other legal
services and the third party is not “too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to
protection;185 or (3) the lawyer and the third party enjoy a relationship of “nearprivity.”186 In fact, all of these descriptions of lawyers’ duties to third parties
comport with the section 552(2) restrictions.187
Although fraud and negligent misrepresentation are different causes of action, and fraud is plainly distinguished from negligent misrepresentation by the
element of scienter, misrepresentation is a core concept of each claim. This
raises the parallel questions of (1) whether plaintiffs suing for negligent misrepresentation should have to meet the stringent pleading requirement for fraud;
and (2) whether plaintiffs should have to prove negligent misrepresentation by
clear and convincing evidence, the common standard for fraud cases.
The easy answer to both questions is no. As to the first, rules of civil procedure that mandate particularized pleading for fraud do not similarly specify
negligent misrepresentation;188 negligence claims do not have to be pleaded
with particularity;189 and, from a defendant’s perspective, negligent misrepresentation allegations do not pose the potential reputational harm that fraud allegations do.190 Regarding the second question, proof of negligence is evaluated
under a preponderance of the evidence standard and negligent misrepresentation is simply a form of that tort.191 Not all courts accept these answers, however.
Federal courts are split on whether plaintiffs must plead negligent misrepresentation with the particularity required for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), or whether negligent misrepresentation allegations are gov-

184

Id. at 1359–60.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
186
Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund V, L.P. v. Mayer Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, 612 F. Supp.
2d 267, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying New York law); see also Hedges v. Durrance, 834
A.2d 1, 5 (Vt. 2003) (reciting an identical standard).
187
See Petrillo, 655 A.2d at 1359–60 (referring to a draft of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS and to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552); McCamish,
Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 793–95 (Tex. 1999)
(reasoning to the same effect).
188
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”).
189
Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP., 475 F.3d 824, 837 (7th Cir.
2007).
190
Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003).
191
Commercial Molasses Corp. v. N.Y. Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 113 (1941) (negligence must be proven by a preponderance standard); Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 302 P.3d 1148, 1154 (Nev. 2013) (evidence needed to prove negligent misrepresentation is “almost identical” to that needed to prove negligence).
185
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erned by the less rigorous notice pleading requirement of Rule 8,192 as understood in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly193 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.194 The First and Second Circuits hold that
negligent misrepresentation claims are subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.195 The First Circuit requires a plaintiff to plead negligent misrepresentation with particularity under Rule 9(b) because the cause of action at its
core “effectively charge[s] fraud.”196 In comparison, the Second Circuit
grounds its approach in the recognition that plaintiffs suing for negligent misrepresentation often plead fraud in the alternative, and vice versa, and it makes
little practical sense to impose inconsistent standards of proof.197 While the Second Circuit’s approach has practical appeal, the First Circuit’s approach
makes no sense at all. A negligent misrepresentation claim does not effectively
charge fraud for the simple reason that liability for negligent misrepresentation
does not require a defendant to have acted with scienter.198
In contrast to the First and Second Circuits, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits
adhere to the more forgiving Rule 8 notice pleading requirement for negligent
misrepresentation.199 The Fifth Circuit relies on a literal reading of Rule 9(b),200
which refers only to fraud or mistake, and the Seventh Circuit appears to do
likewise.201 The Fifth Circuit may, however, require parties to plead negligent
misrepresentation with particularity when they do not “urge[ ] a separate focus
on the negligent misrepresentation claims,” as where fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action “are based on the same set of alleged facts.”202

192

See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
193
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring plaintiffs to plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
194
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss
can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”).
195
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Cardinale, 567 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir.
2009); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 583 n.14 (2d Cir.
2005).
196
Cardinale, 567 F.3d at 15.
197
Aniero, 404 F.3d at 583 n.14.
198
See Renaissance Leasing, LLC. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 322 S.W.3d 112, 134 (Mo. 2010)
(“A claim for negligent misrepresentation, unlike one for fraud, does not involve a question
of intent. Rather, such a claim is premised on the theory that the speaker believed the information supplied was correct but was negligent in so believing.”).
199
Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP., 475 F.3d 824, 839 n.10 (7th
Cir. 2007); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d 391, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2005).
200
Posey, 415 F.3d at 396–97.
201
Tricontinental, 475 F.3d at 839 n.10.
202
Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 2003).
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The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that the correct pleading
standard depends on applicable state law.203 In short, if “negligent misrepresentation is a subspecies of fraud” under applicable state law or the state law requires an essential showing of fraud as an element of negligent misrepresentation,204 these courts will apply the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standard.205 At
least one district court in the Tenth Circuit has taken the same approach.206 By
extension, lawyers must also recognize that the pleading standard for negligent
misrepresentation versus fraud varies between states.207
With respect to the burden of proof, courts are again split. Some courts
hold that a plaintiff must prove negligent misrepresentation by a preponderance
of the evidence,208 while other courts require clear and convincing evidence,209
which is the standard generally applied to fraud claims. The former approach
makes more sense because, again, negligent misrepresentation is a form of negligence and generally does not carry the risk of stigma or reputational harm that
accompanies liability for fraud. On the other hand, most lawyers value their
professional reputations and count on their good standing to advance their prac203

Farm Credit Servs. of Am., FLCA v. Haun, 734 F.3d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 2013); Republic
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 247–48 (6th Cir. 2012); Baltimore
Cnty. v. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App’x 914, 921 (4th Cir. 2007); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.
USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003).
204
See Farm Credit Servs. of Am., 734 F.3d at 805 (applying Nebraska law, which treats
negligent misrepresentation as a “subspecies of fraud”); Baltimore Cnty., 238 F. App’x at
921 (holding that Rule 9(b) did not apply because Maryland law did not require an essential
showing of fraud to impose liability for negligent misrepresentation).
205
See, e.g., Republic Bank & Trust Co., 683 F.3d at 247–48 (applying Kentucky law).
206
City of Raton v. Ark. River Power Auth., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1143–44 (D.N.M. 2008)
(discussing Colorado and New Mexico law).
207
Compare Thomas v. Schneider, No. 2009-CA-002132-MR, 2010 WL 3447662, at *1 n.2
(Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2010) (“Like fraud, allegations of negligent misrepresentation must be
pled with particularity.”), and Hardin Cnty. Sav. Bank v. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of
City of Brainerd, 821 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that because “negligent
misrepresentation constitutes fraud,” a plaintiff must plead negligent misrepresentation with
particularity), with Hayes v. Iworx, Inc., No. CV-06-168, 2006 WL 2959702, at *4 (Me. Super. Ct. July 31, 2006) (“A claim for negligent misrepresentation . . . does not sound in fraud
or mistake, but in negligence, and [Rule] 9(b)’s pleading requirements are inapplicable to
claims sounding in negligence.”), and Davis, Malm, D’Agostine, P.C. v. Vale, No. 041495,
2005 WL 1155171, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2005) (“A claim of fraudulent misrepresentation must be pleaded with particularity. . . . Negligent misrepresentation, on the other
hand, need only be averred generally.”), and Delaney v. Bates, No. BDV-92-1120, 1993
Mont. Dist. LEXIS 698, at *9 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Jan. 27, 1993) (“Unlike pleading fraud, there
is no requirement that negligent misrepresentation be plead with any degree of particularity.”), and Hunter v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 593 S.E.2d 595, 600 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004) (declining to impose a particularity requirement on plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim as it did on fraud claim).
208
See, e.g., Holland v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co., 3 So. 3d 94, 101 (Miss. 2008); In re Convisser, 242 P.3d 299, 307 (N.M. 2010); McLaughlin v. Williams, 665 S.E.2d 667, 670 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2008); Excel Constr., Inc. v. HKM Eng’g, Inc., 228 P.3d 40, 49 (Wyo. 2010).
209
See, e.g., Aesthetics in Jewelry, Inc. v. Brown, 339 S.W.3d 489, 495 (Ky. Ct. App.
2011); Dewar v. Smith, 342 P.3d 328, 336 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
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tices in a variety of ways, and therefore consider any finding of liability to be
injurious. It is thus fair for lawyers to argue that, in their cases, plaintiffs should
be required to prove negligent misrepresentation by clear and convincing evidence. The strong counter-argument, of course, is that negligent misrepresentation calls into question a lawyer’s carefulness in a single matter rather than her
honesty, and it is only the latter that can reasonably be considered to have reputational value supporting a higher burden of proof. Were it otherwise, professional negligence claims against lawyers would always call for proof by clear
and convincing evidence.
E. The Role of Rules of Professional Conduct
In considering the issue of duty in negligent misrepresentation cases and
justifiable or reasonable reliance in both fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims, it is logical to question the role that rules of professional conduct do or
should play in making these determinations. Several ethics rules appear to have
obvious application depending on the facts of the case. For example, Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) provides that a lawyer “shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal
or fraudulent.”210 Model Rule 4.1(a) states that in representing a client, a lawyer
“shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a
third person.”211 Model Rule 4.1(b) provides that in representing a client, a
lawyer cannot “knowingly . . . fail to disclose a material fact to a third person
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a
client,” unless the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6 prohibits disclosure.212 Finally, Model Rule 8.4(c) broadly prohibits lawyers from
engaging “in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”213
To be sure, a lawyer’s violation of an ethics rule is not independently actionable.214 Thus, and by way of example, a person to whom a lawyer allegedly
made a false statement of material fact could not sue the lawyer for negligent
misrepresentation on the basis that the lawyer violated Rule 8.4(c), which, to
repeat, prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct involving “misrepresenta-

210

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
Id. r. 4.1(a).
212
Id. r. 4.1(b).
213
Id. r. 8.4(c).
214
Accident & Injury Med. Specialists, P.C. v. Mintz, 279 P.3d 658, 664 (Colo. 2012); In re
Disciplinary Action Against Montez, 812 N.W.2d 58, 66–67 (Minn. 2012); Lucas v. Stevenson, 294 P.3d 377, 382 (Mont. 2013); Green v. Morgan Props., 73 A.3d 478, 494 (N.J.
2013); Spencer v. Barber, 299 P.3d 388, 395–96 (N.M. 2013); Unarco Material Handling,
Inc. v. Liberato, 317 S.W.3d 227, 239 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010); Joyner v. DeFriend, 255
S.W.3d 281, 283 (Tex. App. 2008); Behnke v. Ahrens, 294 P.3d 729, 738 (Wash. Ct. App.
2012); Douglas R. Richmond, Why Legal Ethics Rules Are Relevant to Lawyer Liability, 38
ST. MARY’S L.J. 929, 937 (2007).
211
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tion.”215 But what of the more confined question of duty? Model Rules 4.1(a)
and 8.4(c) certainly impose a duty of honesty on lawyers in a professional responsibility sense. Could a plaintiff claiming negligent misrepresentation successfully extend that duty to tort law and allege that a lawyer owed her a duty
of reasonable care under the circumstances by virtue of Model Rules 4.1(a) and
8.4(c)?
While there are sound arguments in some cases for basing a lawyer’s alleged duty on related rules of professional conduct, courts have held that the
answer to that question is no; any alleged duty has to be grounded in the common law.216 In our hypothetical case, that would likely be case law in the jurisdiction adopting section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.217 Indeed, if
the jurisdiction had adopted section 552, the plaintiff would not need Model
Rules 4.1(a) or 8.4(c) or state analogs to support an alleged duty.218
This does not mean, however, that rules of professional conduct are irrelevant to our hypothetical plaintiff or to the duty owed by the defending lawyer.
Although the rules may not be employed to establish the lawyer’s duty, they
may be relevant to the standard of care or conduct against which the lawyer’s
duty is measured.219 For example, the plaintiff might rely on Rule 4.1(a) or
Rule 8.4(c) to argue that the lawyer did not exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the information at issue—that the lawyer’s ethical obligations required her to do more to ascertain that the information was accurate,
or that because of the rules the lawyer was obligated to do more along those
lines than someone else would have been.
Rules of professional conduct play a greater role in negligent misrepresentation and fraud cases in which the defending lawyer contends that the plaintiff
did not justifiably or reasonably rely on her alleged misstatements. Here, ethics
rules imposing on lawyers an obligation of honesty to third parties may be quite
relevant to the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s reliance on a lawyer’s representations.220 An essential fact, however, will be the plaintiff’s knowledge of those
rules. For a plaintiff to have justifiably relied on a lawyer’s statements based on
ethics rules imposing a duty of honesty on the lawyer, such as Model Rules
215

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
Rosenbaum v. White, 692 F.3d 593, 604 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Indiana law);
Blankinship v. Brown, 399 S.W.3d 303, 311 (Tex. App. 2013).
217
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others”).
218
See generally Schmitz v. Davis, No. 10-CV-4011-SAC, 2010 WL 3861843, at *7 (D.
Kan. Sept. 23, 2010) (observing that “[a]ttorney conduct which violates an ethics rule may
also violate an independent legal duty and a cause of action may ensue”).
219
Rosenbaum, 692 F.3d at 604; Spencer, 299 P.3d at 395–96.
220
Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 73 P.3d 687, 703 (Haw. 2003); see also
Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 716 N.W.2d 366, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)
(“A jury could reasonably conclude that because attorneys have a professional duty not to
make false assertions, even to adversaries, [the plaintiffs’ owner’s] reliance was reasonable.”).
216
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4.1(a) or 8.4(c), the plaintiff must have known of the rules and the duties they
impose on lawyers at the time of the alleged misrepresentation.221 Furthermore,
the application of ethics rules alone will seldom serve to establish plaintiffs’
justifiable or reasonable reliance; other factors frequently come into play.222
Still, there is no doubting the potential force of rules of professional conduct
when analyzing the element of reliance in fraud and negligent misrepresentation cases against lawyers.223
Rules of professional conduct may play a greater role in constructive fraud
cases because constructive fraud requires a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties.224 Ethics rules may inform the scope of lawyers’ fiduciary duties.225 In some jurisdictions, a lawyer’s violation of an ethics rule may
be sufficient to support a plaintiff’s claim that the lawyer violated a fiduciary
duty.226 Thus, in a constructive fraud case, a lawyer’s violation of an ethics rule
might evidence a breach of fiduciary duty, ultimately leading to liability for
constructive fraud if the plaintiff can satisfy the remaining elements of the
cause of action.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Lawyers may be sued for fraud or negligent misrepresentation in various
contexts. This Part discusses four illustrative cases: two based on lawyers’
statements in connection with litigation, and two arising out of lawyers’ transactional practices.
A. Settlement Negotiations in Litigation
Slotkin v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York227 arose out of a medical malpractice case. Charlotte Slotkin gave birth to a brain-damaged son, Steven, in
Beth-El Hospital in New York City in 1963.228 She was a diabetic and Steven’s
221

See, e.g., Hoyt Props., 716 N.W.2d at 375 (involving a business owner who was a lawyer
and who thus was aware of the opposing lawyers’ duties not to make false statements of fact
or law under Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 4.1).
222
See Richmond, supra note 214, at 960 (discussing a plaintiff’s reliance on a lawyer’s alleged misrepresentation in a Missouri case).
223
See, e.g., Hoyt Props., 716 N.W.2d at 375 (holding that the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s owner’s reliance on the accuracy of the statements made by opposing counsel based on
their duties under Rule 4.1 presented a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment for the defense).
224
Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 854 (Ct. App.
2014).
225
Id. at 851; Kidney Ass’n of Or., Inc. v. Ferguson, 843 P.2d 442, 446 n.12 (Or. 1992) (explaining that rules of professional conduct may describe lawyers’ fiduciary duties to clients
at least in part).
226
See, e.g., Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying District of Columbia law).
227
614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1979).
228
Id. at 305.
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brain damage was attributable to the hospital’s failure to properly administer
insulin to her before delivery.229 Steven and his father sued Beth-El for medical
malpractice. Beth-El had a $200,000 primary liability insurance policy with
Citizens Casualty Co. and a $1 million excess insurance policy issued by
Lloyd’s of London underwriters.230 Citizens was in somewhat precarious financial shape, inasmuch as it was undergoing liquidation and rehabilitation.231
The case went to trial in February 1971. Christopher McGrath, a Beth-El
defense lawyer hired by Citizens, told the plaintiffs’ lawyer, Max Toberoff, that
Beth-El had only $200,000 in insurance coverage.232 McGrath also revealed
that he had not told Beth-El’s in-house lawyer about the trial and he refused
Toberoff’s request that he notify the hospital.233 Toberoff was concerned about
the collectability of any judgment the plaintiffs might receive and he urgently
communicated with the hospital’s administrator, telling him that Beth-El risked
a verdict exceeding $1 million.234 The administrator dispatched George Berkowitz, a lawyer and Beth-El trustee, to the courthouse.235 Berkowitz also told
Toberoff that Beth-El had only $200,000 in insurance coverage based on information he obtained from McGrath, another defense lawyer, and Citizens’
claims manager, Paul Ratner.236 Both Toberoff and the trial judge thought it
odd that Beth-El had so little insurance.237
Despite Beth-El’s ostensibly low policy limits and the plaintiffs’ willingness to settle within them, the case proceeded to trial. The trial unfolded nicely
for the plaintiffs.238 Just before the plaintiffs rested, a key medical expert for
Beth-El changed his opinion and sided with them.239 The parties hastily convened a settlement conference before the trial judge.240 McGrath again stated
that the total insurance coverage available was $200,000, and that “he knew
that the [h]ospital did not have additional insurance with other companies.”241
Based on this representation, the case settled for $185,000.242 The lawyers
drafted a stipulation to read into the record which provided that “the attorney
for the defendant represents that the total insurance coverage of the defendant is
the sum of $200,000, under a policy with Citizens Casualty, and to the best of

229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 306.
Id.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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his knowledge there are no other policies covering this event.”243 McGrath and
Berkowitz verbally approved the stipulation on the record.244
The obvious problem was that McGrath’s and Berkowitz’s representations
were false.245 While Berkowitz’s misstatements could be excused due to his second-hand knowledge and the lack of a reason to doubt its sources, the same
could not be said of McGrath’s misrepresentations. McGrath had “complete access” to documents clearly demonstrating the existence of the excess policy,
such as letters from a lawyer for the Lloyd’s of London underwriters inquiring
about the Slotkin case.246 The file containing these letters was in the possession
of McGrath’s firm during the trial.247
The existence of the Lloyd’s of London excess policy was revealed shortly
after the settlement.248 The trial judge had not yet entered an order allocating
the settlement funds and thus there was no final judgment.249 Unfortunately, the
parties could not re-open settlement discussions because the Lloyd’s underwriters refused to participate based on late notice of the Slotkin claim.250 For a variety of reasons, the plaintiffs could not re-try the case.251 The trial court thus approved the $185,000 settlement, with Toberoff’s intention to sue for fraud
being well known.252
The plaintiffs sued Citizens, its reinsurers, McGrath, Ratner, Berkowitz,
and another lawyer for Citizens in federal court.253 The jury returned a
$680,000 verdict for the plaintiffs for fraud, allocating the damages as
$500,000 to Citizens, $100,000 to Berkowitz, $60,000 to Ratner, and $20,000
to McGrath.254 The district court granted the defendants’ motion for JNOV.255 It
reasoned that because the plaintiffs learned of the excess policy before the trial
court had entered a final judgment, they were bound by the settlement.256 The
court further reasoned that the “plaintiffs had not significantly changed position
to their prejudice before learning the truth” about the hospital’s insurance coverage.257 The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit.

243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 307–08.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 308–09.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 309–10.
Id. at 310.
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Id. at 310–11.
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On appeal, the Slotkin court concluded that the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for JNOV.258 Believing that the jury could have reasonably found that the various misrepresentations made to the plaintiffs constituted legal fraud, the court addressed the defendants’ liability.259
The Second Circuit reasoned that the jury could have properly found
McGrath liable for fraud.260 McGrath stipulated that to the best of his
knowledge, there was only $200,000 in insurance coverage available to BethEl, despite his possession of documents indicating that the hospital had $1 million in excess coverage.261 McGrath’s insistence that the hospital had only
$200,000 in coverage in the face of contrary facts met the New York definition
of scienter: “ ‘a reckless indifference to error,’ ‘a pretense of exact knowledge,’
or ‘[an] assertion of a false material fact “susceptible of accurate knowledge”
but stated to be true on the personal knowledge of the representer.’ ”262 Berkowitz, on the other hand, avoided liability.263 While he was easily negligent or
even grossly negligent in making the statements that he did about Beth-El’s insurance, his conduct did not reflect the scienter necessary for fraud liability under New York law.264 The court ultimately gave the plaintiffs the option of either reinstating the $680,000 judgment, or retrying the case against all
defendants except Berkowitz.265 McGrath petitioned for rehearing to no avail.266
It is difficult to understand how McGrath could have made the representations he did about insurance coverage. The notion that Beth-El had only
$200,000 in coverage struck both Toberoff and the trial court as unusual; it
should have similarly impressed McGrath. At the very least, Toberoff’s and the
court’s reservations should have inspired McGrath to attempt to ascertain the
hospital’s true coverage before finally committing to $200,000.
It seems more likely that McGrath knew of the hospital’s excess policy and
opted to conceal its existence. After all, he had correspondence from a lawyer
for the excess carrier inquiring about the status of the case in his files.267 A defense lawyer in McGrath’s shoes would normally be expected to know about
the existence of excess insurance.268 It is no answer to say that McGrath had

258

Id. at 314.
Id.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Id. at 315.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 318.
266
Id. at 324–25.
267
Id. at 307–08.
268
Today, McGrath would certainly know about the existence of excess coverage by virtue
of routine pretrial discovery and disclosures. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) (requiring
the initial disclosure of “any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be
liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse
259
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nothing to gain and much to lose from concealing the excess policy,269 because
he arguably did have something to gain by concealing it. That is, by settling a
difficult case on favorable terms, he might have impressed Citizens or the
Lloyd’s underwriters with his craftiness and thus have earned additional business from them. Or, he might have thought that Beth-El administrators would
be impressed by his tactical prowess and engage him to defend the hospital in
future medical malpractice cases. Regardless, Slotkin demonstrates that fraud
and negligent misrepresentation claims against lawyers can even arise out of
adversarial encounters.
B. Litigators’ Allegedly Fraudulent Statements Outside of Settlement
Negotiations
Shafer v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon, & Gladstone,270 like
Slotkin, arose out of a lawyer’s misstatement about insurance coverage, albeit
in a different context. The plaintiffs in Shafer were homeowners who pursued
arbitration against their builder, Tri County Builders, and Tri County’s two
partners, Jay DeMay and Perry Hanstad, to recover for construction defects in
their home.271 The Shafers’ arbitration demand included claims for breach of
contract, fraud, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
sought both compensatory and punitive damages.272 DeMay tendered the defense of the Shafers’ action to Tri County’s liability insurer, Truck Insurance
Exchange (“Truck”).273 Truck agreed to defend Tri County, DeMay, and Hanstad under a reservation of rights.274 DeMay responded to Truck’s reservation
of rights letter by asking Truck to provide him with independent counsel at its
expense.275 DeMay was concerned that because the Shafers alleged both negligent and intentional wrongdoing, any defense lawyer Truck appointed would
for payments made to satisfy the judgment”). Toberoff would know about the presence of
excess insurance for the same reason.
269
Slotkin, 614 F.2d at 318–19 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
270
131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777 (Ct. App. 2003).
271
Id. at 782.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id. A “reservation of rights” refers to an insurance company’s unilateral decision to reserve its right to later contest coverage notwithstanding its initial decision to defend the insured. See Mastellone v. Lightning Rod Mut. Ins. Co., 884 N.E.2d 1130, 1139–40 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2008) (“By definition, a reservation of rights means that the insurer does not believe
that coverage is available under the policy, but that it is proceeding to defend a claim in order to control the defense.”). An insurer reserves its rights by sending the insured a reservation of rights letter. A reservation of rights letter puts the insured on notice that there may be
a conflict between its interests and those of the insurer, and that the insured may potentially
be exposed to personal liability. Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Stephens, 825 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992).
275
Shafer, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783. For more information about insureds’ right to independent counsel, see Douglas R. Richmond, Independent Counsel in Insurance, 48 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 857, 858–59 (2011).
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have a conflict of interest given that a finding of liability based on intentional
acts would allow Truck to deny coverage, while a determination of negligence
would obligate it to indemnify the defendants.276
Truck sought advice regarding DeMay’s request from Lance LaBelle of the
Berger, Kahn law firm.277 LaBelle communicated with Chris Lundblad of
Truck about modifying Truck’s original reservation of rights letter so as to allow Truck to control the defense of the arbitration, rather than having to accept
independent counsel.278 Thereafter, LaBelle issued a superseding reservation of
rights letter on Truck’s behalf that no longer reserved Truck’s right to deny
coverage for liability premised on the defendants’ willful or intentional acts,
but which still reserved Truck’s right to deny coverage for punitive damages.279
This letter, when read together with the original reservation of rights letter and
a separate letter from LaBelle to Lundblad regarding the plan to retain control
of the defense, implicitly acknowledged Truck’s obligation to indemnify the
defendants if they were held liable for willful misconduct.280
The Shafers’ case went to arbitration and the arbitrators awarded them over
$311,000 against all three defendants, and $25,000 against DeMay alone for
fraud.281 A trial court affirmed the award and entered judgment for the Shafers.282
Truck grudgingly paid $120,000 of the judgment.283 In a letter to the Shafers’ lawyer transmitting the check for that payment, LaBelle referred to the superseding reservation of rights letter—although he did not include a copy of the
letter—and asserted that California public policy precluded indemnity for
fraud-related damages.284 In another letter to the Shafers’ lawyer, LaBelle emphasized that the arbitrators had found that the defendants had never intended
to perform their contract with the Shafers and explained that the Truck policy
did not cover property damage expected or intended by the insureds.285 Truck
never fully satisfied the compensatory damage portion of the judgment.286
Hanstad tried to discharge the judgment against him in bankruptcy but
failed.287 He then successfully sued Truck for bad faith, represented by the
Shafers’ lawyer.288 During discovery in the bad faith case, the Shafers’ lawyer
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Shafer, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783.
Id.
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learned for the first time that Truck had agreed to indemnify Tri County,
DeMay, and Hanstad against liability for willful acts.289 LaBelle, who was deposed in the bad faith case, acknowledged the agreement between Truck and
the defendants in the underlying litigation.290
Armed with this information, the Shafers sued Truck and LaBelle, as well
as Berger, Kahn for fraud.291 LaBelle filed a demurrer, arguing that he had no
duty to truthfully disclose the defendants’ insurance coverage to the Shafers
and that the Shafers had not justifiably relied on any statements he made.292 The
trial court granted the demurrer with leave to amend. The Shafers filed an
amended complaint alleging fraud and conspiracy that read, in part, as follows:
After the Shafers obtained a judgment against Truck’s insureds, LaBelle represented to the Shafers that Truck had not agreed to provide indemnity for willful
acts. In fact, Truck had agreed to indemnification. While LaBelle and Truck
knew that the statement about indemnity was false, the Shafers did not know of
its falsity. LaBelle made the false statement with the intention of inducing the
Shafers to forgo full payment on the judgment. The Shafers relied on LaBelle’s
false statement, resulting in economic and noneconomic damages.293

LaBelle again demurred, and this time the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the case against LaBelle and his law
firm.294 The Shafers appealed to the California Court of Appeal.
On appeal, the Shafers contended that the trial court erred in dismissing
their fraud claim. The appellate court agreed.295 In doing so, the court rejected
LaBelle’s arguments that his statements about insurance coverage were not actionable because they were legal opinions, that he owed the Shafers’ no duty of
truthfulness in any event, and that any claimed reliance on the Shafers’ part was
unjustified.296
It was clear to the court from the two reservation of rights letters and LaBelle’s separate letter to Lundblad that Truck had agreed to indemnify Tri
County, DeMay, and Hanstad against liability arising out of their willful acts to
avoid paying for independent counsel for its insureds.297 Yet, to justify Truck’s
payment of only $120,000 toward a judgment of approximately $336,000, LaBelle directed the Shafers’ lawyer to the policy language precluding coverage
for intentional acts and a California statute foreclosing insurance coverage for
willful acts.298 “Thus, LaBelle allegedly misrepresented the scope of insurance

289
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Id.
Id.
Id. (noting that the Shafers also sued Truck for breach of contract and bad faith).
Id.
Id. at 786–87.
Id. at 787.
Id.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 792–93.
Id. at 793.
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coverage” even though “[h]e had a duty not to make fraudulent statements.”299
Under the circumstances, it was reasonably apparent that the Shafers would regard LaBelle’s statements about insurance coverage as statements of fact rather
than as legal opinions.300 Accordingly, the Shafers’ amended complaint adequately pleaded that LaBelle had made fraudulent statements about Truck’s insurance coverage and that they reasonably viewed his statements as expressions
of fact.301
As for the reasonableness of the Shafers’ reliance on LaBelle’s statements
regarding coverage, they had no reason to doubt him, and they had no reason to
suspect Truck’s true coverage position, because they never received copies of
either of Truck’s reservation of rights letters.302 In short, “the Shafers reasonably relied on the coverage representations made by counsel for an insurance
company.”303 Furthermore, LaBelle’s relationship with the Shafers was not that
of an adversary or opponent, as the court explained:
Under section 11580 [of the California Insurance Code], Truck had to pay the
Shafers the amount of the judgment, subject to the terms . . . of the insurance
policy, including any reservation of rights . . . . In that sense, the Shafers were to
be treated as the insureds. Section 11580 “inure[s] to the benefit of any and every person who might be negligently injured by the assured as completely as if
such injured person had been specifically named in the policy.” And, as stated
[earlier in the opinion], the Shafers were third party beneficiaries of the insurance policy [because they were judgment creditors of the defendants].304

Finally, LaBelle argued that the litigation privilege attached to his statements about insurance coverage and accordingly rendered them nonactionable.305 The court rejected LaBelle’s argument, reasoning that recognizing the litigation privilege would be inconsistent with section 11580 of the California Insurance Code, which empowers a party who obtains a judgment
against an insured to sue the insurer as a judgment creditor to collect the judgment.306 As interpreted by the California Supreme Court, that statute also
makes a judgment creditor a third party beneficiary of the insurance policy on
which it is suing, further indicating that the litigation privilege should not operate to defeat a judgment creditor’s exercise of its statutory right.307 Continuing,
the court explained:

299

Id.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 2000)).
301
Id. at 793.
302
Id.
303
Id. at 793–94.
304
Id. at 794 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
305
Id. at 795. Generally speaking, the litigation privilege shields lawyers against liability
based on communications made in connection with judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Id.
306
Id. at 795–96.
307
Id. at 796–97 (quoting Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 584, 587–88 (Cal. 1976)).
300
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Just as an insurer may be liable for defrauding its insured . . . so an insurer
should not be allowed to deceive a third party beneficiary of an insurance policy.
And if an insurer may be found liable to a third party beneficiary for fraud, so
may its coverage counsel.
Counsel retained by an insurer has an obligation to be truthful in describing
insurance coverage to a third party beneficiary. The litigation privilege is not a
license to deceive an injured party who steps into the shoes of an insured. Section 11580 grants an injured party the right to file suit in order to recover under
the insurance policy. Coverage counsel may not commit fraud in an attempt to
defeat that right.308

LaBelle’s litigation privilege argument was doomed from the outset for
two additional reasons. One, it did not track any of the purposes underlying the
litigation privilege.309 These include safeguarding witnesses and litigants from
subsequent tort suits, ensuring open communications, promoting zealous representation, obligating litigants to expose witnesses’ biases and false evidence,
and enhancing the finality of judgments.310 Two, the litigation privilege generally does not protect a lawyer against liability for fraud.311
After concluding that the Shafers could sue LaBelle for fraud and that the
trial court erred in sustaining LaBelle’s demurrer without leave to amend,312 the
Shafer court went on to hold that the Shafers could sue LaBelle for conspiring
with Truck to defraud them.313 It therefore reversed the trial court’s judgment
for LaBelle.314
Although surely disappointing to LaBelle and his firm, the decision in
Shafer was unsurprising. First, recall that the case reached the Shafer court on
appeal from a demurrer, meaning that the court assumed all well-pleaded facts
in the Shafers’ amended complaint to be true and applied a de novo standard of
review to determine whether the amended complaint stated a cause of action.315
Second, rather than being non-actionable legal opinions, LaBelle’s coverage
statements were (1) under the circumstances, reasonably capable of construction as statements of fact;316 and (2) probably constituted “statements of law

308

Id. at 797 (citations omitted).
Id. at 798.
310
Id.
311
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000)); N.Y. Cooling Towers, Inc. v. Goidel, 805 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 (2005); Moss v.
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 285 P.3d 1157, 1166 (Utah 2012); Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 870 (W. Va. 2005). But see Dawley v. NF Energy Corp. of Am., 492
F. App’x 77, 80 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying the absolute litigation privilege to fraud claims
under Florida law); Simms v. Seaman, 69 A.3d 880, 892 (Conn. 2013) (stating that “attorneys are shielded by the litigation privilege from claims of fraud”).
312
Shafer, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 799.
313
Id. at 801.
314
Id.
315
Maslo v. Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins., 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 859 (Ct. App. 2014)
(quoting Kyablue v. Watkins, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156, 158 (Ct. App. 2012)).
316
Shafer, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
309

16 NEV. L.J. 57, RICHMOND - FINAL.DOCX

Fall 2015]

FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION

1/15/16 1:34 PM

93

that impl[ied] knowledge of facts,” which are actionable.317 Third, the court’s
view was surely colored by LaBelle’s offensive attempt “to have his cake and
eat it too.”318 After all, he formulated a strategy that created coverage for the
Shafers’ claims to spare Truck independent counsel fees and then, to avoid the
very obligation he created, turned full circle—knowingly exposing Truck’s insureds to personal liability and deliberately impairing the Shafers’ statutory
rights in the process.
C. Third Party Reliance on a Lawyer’s Statements in a Real Estate
Transaction
Unlike Slotkin and Shafer, where the claims against the lawyers arose out
of their conduct in connection with litigation, Petrillo v. Bachenberg319 arose
out of a lawyer’s transactional practice. The Petrillo saga began in 1987, when
Rohrer Construction wanted to sell a tract of undeveloped land in Union Township, New Jersey. Rohrer was represented by lawyer Bruce Herrigel.320 Rohrer
hired Heritage Consulting Engineers to conduct percolation tests on the land in
connection with a planned sale of the property to Land Resources Corp.321 Union Township required two successful percolation tests to approve a septic system.322 Unfortunately for Rohrer, Heritage’s first report in September 1987 revealed that only one of the twenty-two tests was successful.323 A second report
issued in November 1987 showed that of eight tests conducted in the prior
month, only one succeeded.324 In other words, of the thirty tests that Heritage
conducted over the course of two months, twenty-eight were unsuccessful and
only two were successful.325 This suggested that the two successful tests were
anomalies and did not reflect the property’s true soil profile, and therefore that
the property was not suitable for a septic system.326 Rohrer’s contract to sell the
property to Land Resources thus fell through.327
Rohrer then listed the property for sale with a real estate broker,
Bachenberg & Bachenberg, Inc.328 In October 1988, William Bachenberg

317

Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 716 N.W.2d 366, 372–73 (Minn. Ct. App.
2006), aff’d, 736 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 2007).
318
Shafer, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794.
319
Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354 (N.J. 1995).
320
Id. at 1355.
321
Id. Percolation tests are used to determine whether soil is suitable for the installation of a
septic system. Id.
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
Id.
326
Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 623 A.2d 272, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 655
A.2d 1354 (N.J. 1995).
327
Petrillo, 655 A.2d at 1355.
328
Id.
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(“Bachenberg”) asked Herrigel for information about the property.329 In response, Herrigel told Bachenberg that “he had some perc results,” and sent him
a two-page document that consisted of one page from each of the two reports
Heritage prepared for Rohrer.330 The first page was the first page of Heritage’s
initial report, which reflected one successful test and five failed tests.331 The second page was taken from Heritage’s second report; it reflected one successful
and one failed test.332 Herrigel’s “composite report” thus appeared to reflect a
single series of seven percolation tests with two successful tests, rather than the
true result: thirty tests with only two successful tests, an indication the property
was a poor candidate for a septic system.333 Bachenberg & Bachenberg included Herrigel’s composite report in its sales literature.334 Herrigel would later
admit that he had complete copies of both Heritage reports but that he instead
gave Bachenberg the composite report.335
In December 1988, Bachenberg and a partner, John Matthews, bought the
property at a sheriff’s sale for $70,000.336 Bachenberg asked Rohrer for a copy
of Heritage’s percolation test reports soon thereafter, but Rohrer refused to
share them because Bachenberg would not reimburse him for the cost of Heritage’s engineering fees.337
Bachenberg later listed the property for sale at a price of $160,000.338 In
February 1989, Lisa Petrillo inquired about purchasing the property to build
and operate a childcare facility.339 Bachenberg gave her a copy of the composite
report during their first meeting.340
In June 1989, Petrillo agreed to buy the property for $160,000.341 Herrigel
represented Bachenberg in the sale.342 Herrigel did not tell Petrillo’s lawyer that
the composite report omitted numerous test results.343 At the insistence of Petrillo’s lawyer, the sales contract gave Petrillo forty-five days to perform independent soil and water tests on the property, including percolation tests. The
329

Id.
Id.
331
Id.
332
Id.
333
Id.
334
Id.
335
Id. (noting that in Herrigel’s appellate papers he stated that “he delivered the composite
report to Bachenberg,” and “[did] not deny that he prepared the composite report,” but argued that “ ‘there was no evidence given during plaintiff’s proofs [at trial] that [he] had in
fact prepared the erroneous two-page report’ ”) (quoting Herrigel’s appellate papers).
336
Id.
337
Id.
338
Id. at 1356.
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contract further provided that she could rescind the deal if the percolation tests
were unsatisfactory to her.344
In August 1989, an engineering firm working for Petrillo performed six unsuccessful percolation tests on the property and concluded that it was unsuitable for a septic system.345 Petrillo promptly informed Bachenberg that their
sales contract was null and void.346
In response, Bachenberg hired Heritage to design a septic system that
would satisfy the Township, but Petrillo refused to accept the design.347 Petrillo
asked for time to conduct additional percolation tests, but Bachenberg declined
her request.348 During these ongoing negotiations, Herrigel sent Petrillo the
complete copies of the Heritage reports prepared for Rohrer.349 Bachenberg and
Petrillo never could resolve their differences.
When Bachenberg refused to return Petrillo’s $16,000 down payment on
the theory that she had breached their contract, she sued him, Matthews, and
Herrigel for the return of her down payment and the cost of her engineering
fees.350 She alleged that the defendants were guilty of breach of contract, fraud,
concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy.351 With respect to
Herrigel, she alleged that his failure to timely provide her with the complete
Heritage reports breached a duty he owed her.352 Petrillo claimed that had she
known that the property had passed only two of the thirty percolation tests, she
never would have contracted to buy the land or hired engineering firms to undertake site work.353
The case went to trial, and at the close of the plaintiff’s case the trial court
directed a verdict for Herrigel, reasoning that he owed Petrillo no duties.354
Losing her remaining claims either on motion or by way of defense verdict, Petrillo appealed.355
The appellate court reversed the dismissal of Petrillo’s negligent misrepresentation claim against Herrigel. The court reasoned that a jury could have
found that when Herrigel gave Bachenberg the composite report, “Herrigel
should have known that Bachenberg would provide the report to a prospective
purchaser, such as Petrillo, who would rely on the report in deciding whether to

344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
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Id. at 1356–57.
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purchase the property.”356 Herrigel then sought review by the New Jersey Supreme Court.357
The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that whether a lawyer may be
held to owe a duty to a non-client requires a balancing of the lawyer’s duty to
vigorously represent his client with “the duty not to provide misleading information on which third parties foreseeably will rely.”358 When courts extend
lawyers’ duties to third parties, they typically do so where the lawyer intended
that a third party would rely on the lawyer’s work or should have foreseen that
possibility.359 The court explained that preparation of legal opinion letters is an
archetypal example of lawyer conduct giving rise to third-party liability because a legal opinion letter is intended to induce reliance by others, but the
preparation of other types of documents and other sales-related activities can
also expose lawyers to third-party liability.360 The court also recognized that
lawyers may owe a duty of care to non-clients when they know or reasonably
should know that non-clients will rely on their representations and the nonclients are not too remote from the lawyers to deserve protection.361 Indeed, that
is the negligent misrepresentation regime expressed in section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.362
Although Herrigel did not prepare an opinion letter, he extracted information from the Heritage test reports, created the composite report, and gave
the composite report to Bachenberg.363 The court’s initial task, therefore, was to
determine the purpose of the composite report.364
It was possible that Herrigel may have intended the composite report to reflect only that the property had passed two percolation tests.365 But Herrigel’s
subjective intent did not control the court’s analysis; rather, the objective meaning of the composite report was the relevant factor.366 In assessing the report’s
objective meaning, the court was influenced by the parties’ roles.367 Herrigel
was a lawyer who, in connection with his client’s efforts to sell the property,
356

Id. at 1357. The appellate court also reversed other aspects of the trial court judgment in
ways favorable to Petrillo, see id., but those issues are not relevant to our discussion.
357
Id. at 1355.
358
Id. at 1357.
359
Id.
360
Id. at 1360. (discussing Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 915–17 (6th
Cir. 1991) (involving a lawyer’s preparation of a private offering statement for a client);
Century 21 Deep S. Props., Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 374 (Miss. 1992) (holding a
lawyer liable to third-parties for negligence in a title search)).
361
Petrillo, 655 A.2d at 1359–60.
362
Id. at 1360 (referring to and quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM.
LAW. INST. 1977)).
363
Id. at 1361.
364
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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delivered the composite report to a real estate broker.368 The court inferred that
when Herrigel gave the composite report to Bachenberg, he knew, or should
have known, that Bachenberg might share it with prospective purchasers of the
property.369 Even so, Herrigel did nothing to limit prospective purchasers’ foreseeable use of the report.370 He never indicated in the composite report or a
cover letter that the report was incomplete or might be considered inaccurate
because it did not reflect all percolation test results.371
After Bachenberg purchased the property from Rohrer, Herrigel represented him in connection with the aborted sale of the property to Petrillo.372 “Although compiling an engineering report to help a client sell real estate may not
be part of a lawyer’s stock-in-trade,” the court observed, “representing the seller of real estate is a traditional legal service.”373 Herrigel’s continuing involvement as a lawyer in the transfer of the property permitted the court to infer “that
the objective purpose of the [composite] report was to induce a prospective
purchaser to buy the property.”374 His continuing involvement supported the
further inference that he knew Bachenberg intended to use the composite report
to assure prospective buyers of the property’s suitability for a septic system.375
A prospective buyer reading the composite report reasonably could believe
that the property had passed two of seven percolation tests rather than two of
thirty.376 And, based on that conclusion, a person might agree to buy the property when she would never do so if she had seen the complete set of percolation
test reports.377 In the court’s view, Herrigel should have foreseen that scenario.378 In summary, it would be reasonable for a jury to infer that the composite
report misrepresented material facts.379
By giving Bachenberg the composite report and thereafter representing him
in the contested sale of the property to Petrillo, “Herrigel assumed a duty to Petrillo to provide reliable information regarding the percolation tests.”380 He
“controlled the risk that the composite report would mislead a purchaser” of the
property.381 It was therefore fair for Herrigel to shoulder the risk of loss resulting from the delivery of a misleading report.382 As the court summarized:
368
369
370
371
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374
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Herrigel easily could have limited his liability. Most simply, he could have sent
complete copies of both [Heritage] reports to Bachenberg. Alternatively, Herrigel could have sent a letter to Bachenberg stating that the property had passed
two successful percolation tests as required by Union Township. Or he could
have stated either in a letter to Bachenberg or in the composite report that the report evidenced only that the property had yielded two successful percolation
tests and that no one should rely on the report for any other purpose. Because
Herrigel did nothing to limit the objective purpose of the composite report, he
should have foreseen that Petrillo, as a prospective purchaser, would rely on the
facts set forth in the report. Accordingly, Herrigel’s duty extend[ed] to Petrillo.
Given Petrillo’s concern about percolation . . . Herrigel’s duty include[d] the obligation to provide information about unsuccessful, as well as successful, percolation tests.383

The court was careful to note that its decision did not preclude a jury from
finding in Herrigel’s favor.384 It was possible that a jury might find that Petrillo
only cared that the property had passed two percolation tests, or that the omission of the many unsuccessful tests from the composite report was neither material nor misleading; those were all factual issues to be resolved on remand.385
The Petrillo court decided only that a jury should be allowed to “determine . . .
the effect of Herrigel’s alleged negligent misrepresentation.”386 The New Jersey
Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the judgment of the lower appellate
court.387
A dissenting justice argued that Herrigel’s preparation of the composite report was nothing like the preparation of a legal opinion where, in the latter case,
the authoring lawyer intends to induce reliance by third parties.388 The dissenting justice’s essential concern was that the majority effectively was imposing
on lawyers “an overbroad, virtually unlimited duty of care for remote nonclients.”389
Had he sent the composite report to Bachenberg while representing Rohrer
and then had no further dealings with Bachenberg, Herrigel might have been
able to argue that any potential liability to third parties would have been too attenuated to recognize.390 But those weren’t the facts. Herrigel represented
Bachenberg in selling the property to Petrillo.391 In furthering that sale,

383

Id. at 1361–62.
Id. at 1362.
385
Id.
386
Id.
387
Id.
388
Id. at 1365 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
389
Id.
390
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“It is not
enough [for liability] that the maker knows of the ever-present possibility of repetition [of an
alleged misrepresentation] to anyone, and the possibility of action in reliance upon it, on the
part of anyone to whom it may be repeated.”).
391
Petrillo, 655 A.2d at 1363 (Stein, J., concurring).
384
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Bachenberg gave the composite report to Petrillo.392 On those facts, a jury
could conclude that Herrigel should have foreseen that Petrillo would receive a
copy of the composite report and that she would detrimentally rely on it.393 Because of the discrete facts on which the court’s holding rested, a concurring justice reasoned that the likelihood that the court’s decision would materially affect lawyers’ potential liability to third parties was “minimal indeed.”394 As the
majority also noted in blunting the dissent, the holding went “no further than to
state that Herrigel had a duty not to misrepresent negligently the contents of a
material document on which he knew others would rely to their financial detriment.”395 As the court further explained, “[i]n many situations, lawyers, like
people generally, may not have a duty to act, but when they act, like other people, they should act carefully.”396
In hindsight, it is interesting that Herrigel gave Petrillo complete copies of
the two Heritage reports.397 But he did so after Bachenberg had given her the
composite report as part of a sales packet.398 Reading between the lines, those
facts suggest that Herrigel had not anticipated that Bachenberg would give Petrillo the composite report. The problem for Herrigel was that he arguably
should have known that Bachenberg would give the composite report to Petrillo, and that was enough to get the case to a jury.399 It was irrelevant that Herrigel did not know Petrillo’s identity when he delivered the document to
Bachenberg; it is sufficient for purposes of identifying a plaintiff to whom a duty may be owed “that the maker [of an alleged misrepresentation] supplies the
information for repetition to a certain group or class of persons and that the
plaintiff proves to be one of them, even though the maker had never heard of
[her] by name when the information was given.”400
D. The Dean Foods Opinion Controversy
The Petrillo court referred to opinion practice as an area in which lawyers’
potential liability to third parties was well established.401 By way of foundation,
at the closing of a business transaction, the lawyer for the company often delivers to the opposing party—be it an acquiring company, an investor, or a lender—a closing opinion.402 The closing opinion is in fact a letter that sets forth, in
392
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Id.
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Id. at 1362 (majority opinion).
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Id. at 1356.
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Id.
399
Id. at 1361.
400
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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Petrillo, 655 A.2d at 1359, 1361.
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Donald W. Glazer & Arthur Norman Field, No-litigation Opinions Can Be Risky Business, 14 BUS. L. TODAY 37, 37 (2005).
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a series of numbered paragraphs, the lawyer’s legal opinions on issues that the
recipient asked to be addressed.403 It is common for one of the paragraphs to
address legal proceedings involving the company.404 That paragraph does not
actually state a legal opinion; rather, it states the fact that the lawyer knows of
no legal proceedings other than those that have been disclosed to the recipient.405 This confirmation or statement of fact in a closing opinion is often described as a “no-litigation opinion.”406 It is with that background that we arrive
at Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi.407
Dean Foods arose out of the acquisition by Garelick Farms, Inc., a whollyowned subsidiary of Dean Foods, of all of the outstanding stock of Scangas
Bros. Holding, Inc. (“SBHI”).408 For simplicity’s sake, we’ll refer to the acquiring company as Dean Foods. At the time of the acquisition, West Lynn Creamery, Inc. (“WLC”) was a wholly-owned subsidiary of SBHI.409 The law firm of
Rubin & Rudman had represented SBHI and WLC for several years and served
as their counsel in connection with the Dean Foods deal, as well as the events
that would give rise to this litigation.410 Michael Altman, Gene Barton, and
Charles Speleotis were the principal partners at Rubin & Rudman involved in
SBHI’s and WLC’s representation at the time of the events at issue.411
In early October 1997, WLC received a federal grand jury subpoena concerning payments it made to Michael and Cathy Gavriel, who owned Dunkin’
Donut franchises that were WLC customers.412 WLC hired Rubin & Rudman to
represent it in regard to the subpoena.413 Altman assumed responsibility for the
representation and, two weeks later, delivered responsive documents to the Assistant United States Attorney leading the investigation, John Hodgens.414
Hodgens informed Altman that the government considered WLC’s response to
the subpoena to be incomplete and thus expected a records custodian to appear
before the grand jury. Accordingly, Altman interviewed various WLC employees, spoke with counsel representing other parties named in the subpoena, and
advised Speleotis of the status of the matter.415
In the course of his investigation, Altman learned that the government inquiry might involve tax evasion by parties other than WLC, facilitated by
403

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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See id. at 37, 41, 43 (discussing practical aspects of no-litigation opinions).
407
Dean Foods Co. v. Pappathanasi, No. Civ.A. 01-2595 BLS, 2004 WL 3019442 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2004).
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Id. at *1 n.1, *6.
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Id. at *6.
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Id. at *1, *6.
411
Id. at *1.
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WLC’s payment of “rebates” intended to ensure that other vendors did not
place their dairy products in WLC’s coolers in Dunkin’ Donuts stores.416 A
WLC employee testified before the grand jury in late November 1997.417 From
Altman’s perspective, however, the matter went dormant after early December
1997.418 The government made no further document requests, no WLC employees were called to appear before the grand jury, and Altman had no further
contact with Hodgens or lawyers for other parties.419
Beginning in late 1997 and continuing into 1998, Dean Foods talked with
the SBHI shareholders about a stock acquisition of SBHI and, indirectly,
WLC.420 These discussions faltered at least once, in part as a result of internal
dissention within the ranks of the putative sellers, all of whom were family
members with a history of acrimony.421 Ultimately, in June 1998, Dean Foods
agreed to acquire all of the stock of SBHI (and thus WLC) pursuant to a stock
purchase agreement with the SBHI shareholders.422 The selling shareholders
represented to Dean Foods in the agreement that:
Except as set forth in Schedule 2.10 of the Company Disclosure Schedule, there
is no claim, action, suit, litigation, proceeding, arbitration or investigation of any
kind, at law or in equity (including actions or proceedings seeking injunctive relief), pending or, to the Company’s knowledge, threatened against the Company
or any of its subsidiaries, and neither the Company or any of its subsidiaries is
subject to any continuing order of, consent decree, settlement agreement or other
similar written agreement with, or continuing investigation by, any Governmental Entity, or any judgment, order, writ, injunction, decree or award of any Governmental Entity or arbitrator, including, without limitation, cease-and-desist or
other orders.423

Prior to the execution of the stock purchase agreement, Barton and Speleotis met with Arthur Pappathanasi, an SBHI shareholder who represented the
other selling shareholders in the transaction.424 They advised him that the prudent course would be to list the grand jury investigation as on-going litigation
on Schedule 2.10 to the stock purchase agreement.425 Barton and Speleotis provided this advice even though Altman advised them in the meeting that he had
heard nothing from Hodgens for six months and that based on other tax evasion
cases he had handled, it was his “guesstimate” that the matter “had probably
gone away.”426 Pappathanasi declined to follow Barton’s and Speleotis’ advice,
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
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because he feared that it would reignite dissention among the disagreeable family members who were the selling shareholders and interfere with the sale.427
Accordingly, Schedule 2.10, as delivered to Dean Foods, did not mention the
grand jury investigation.428
The stock purchase agreement also required the SBHI shareholders to deliver an opinion letter to Dean Foods.429 Thus, as part of the closing of the sale
on June 30, 1998, Rubin & Rudman delivered an opinion letter that included
the following paragraph:
To our knowledge, except as set forth in Schedule 2.10 of the Company Disclosure Schedule, there is no claim, action, suit, litigation, proceeding, arbitration
or, [sic] investigation of any kind, at law or in equity (including actions or proceedings seeking injunctive relief), pending or threatened against the Company
or any of its subsidiaries and neither the Company nor any of its subsidiaries is
subject to any continuing . . . investigation by, any Governmental Entity . . . .430

The closing opinion also stated that, while Rubin & Rudman had relied on the
factual representations in the stock purchase agreement and had not conducted
an independent investigation into any factual matters, “nothing ha[d] come to
[its] attention which cause[d] [it] to doubt the accuracy” of the schedules to the
stock purchase agreement.431
In September 1998, following Dean Foods’ acquisition of SBHI’s stock
and, indirectly, WLC, the federal investigation of WLC resurfaced with a
vengeance.432 In March 2001, WLC agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States by impeding the IRS’s collection of taxes and paid a
$7.2 million fine.433 WLC also incurred $2.1 million in defense costs.434 Dean
Foods thereafter sued the selling shareholders and Rubin & Rudman in Massachusetts state court, alleging that it would not have agreed to buy WLC had it
known of the grand jury investigation.435
Dean Foods settled with the SBHI shareholders on undisclosed terms, but
its case against Rubin & Rudman went to a bench trial.436 Following that trial,
the court issued a somewhat disjointed opinion in which it stated:
The Rubin and Rudman defendants did not conduct the inquiry that they were
required to make by customary practice. The confirmation they gave, grounded
as it was on errors of fact, created for the recipients the comfort that an ongoing
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investigation did not exist and that nothing had come to the attention of Rubin
and Rudman that cast doubt about the accuracy of that report.437

The court noted that even a modest inquiry by Altman in June 1998 would
have revealed that the government investigation was ongoing.438 The court
found that Rubin & Rudman committed negligent misrepresentation in giving
the opinion on the basis of such inadequate investigation.439 The court further
held that Dean Foods had a right to rely upon the flawed no-litigation opinion.440 Dean Foods unquestionably was among a limited group of people or entities for “whose benefit and guidance Rubin & Rudman” supplied the information in the closing opinion.441 Rubin & Rudman intended for Dean Foods to
rely on the opinion letter as the language of the letter made clear.442 Furthermore, the opinion letter was a condition of the sale closing, it was delivered at
the closing, and the deal closed.443 In the end, the court awarded Dean Foods
damages of approximately $9.3 million, which represented the sum of the fine
assessed against WLC plus the costs that WLC incurred in defending the criminal case, all of which were ultimately borne by Dean Foods as a result of its acquisition of WLC.444
CONCLUSION
Few lawyers think themselves to be at risk for liability based on fraud or
negligent misrepresentation arising out of clients’ representations. This perspective probably rests at least in part on common notions of litigation practice,
where parties generally cannot base fraud or misrepresentation claims on opposing lawyers’ statements. But lawyers may be sued for fraud or negligent
misrepresentation by adversaries in litigation in some cases, as where, for example, they knowingly misrepresent material facts in negotiations. Given the
nature of transactional practice, business lawyers are natural targets of fraud
and negligent misrepresentation claims by counter-parties based on alleged
false statements and failures to disclose information. For that matter, clients
may sue their own lawyers for alleged fraud in appropriate cases. In fact, fraud
and misrepresentation are common theories of liability in suits against lawyers
by both clients and third parties. The question then becomes what lawyers
should do to mitigate the risk of related liability. Advice to be honest is a bromide.
Transactional lawyers should generally advocate to clients full disclosure
whenever known facts are arguably responsive to other parties’ requests for in437
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440
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443
444

Id. at *19.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *12–20.
Id. at *12, 20.
Id. at *19 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
Id. (quoting the opinion letter).
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See id. at *11, 20, 23 (identifying damage elements and entering judgment).
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formation. This almost certainly is lawyers’ duty under applicable rules of professional conduct,445 and regardless, it is invariably in clients’ interests to do so.
If a client resists disclosing a matter potentially material to a transaction when
there is no principled basis to do so, a lawyer should try to persuade the client
to change her mind. If that effort fails, the lawyer may need to consider withdrawing from the representation. Depending on the facts, a lawyer may wish to
consider withdrawing from the representation even where the client has an understandable basis for its reticence, as Pappathanasi seemingly did in the Dean
Foods case.
Transactional lawyers offering any sort of opinions should be careful to
confine their opinions to the subjects specified by the client or third party.446
They should also consider qualifying opinions and statements to third parties in
appropriate matters. Consider, for example, the prudence of the law firm in
Fortress Credit Corp. v. Dechert LLP,447 which was alleged by lenders to have
misrepresented in an opinion letter that “loan documents were duly executed
and delivered and the loan was a valid and binding obligation” on a realty company and New York lawyer turned notorious fraudster Marc Dreier.448 Dreier
supplied the documents and information to the law firm necessary for preparation of the opinion—all of which were forged or falsified.449 Beyond the fact
that the firm had no reason to suspect that the documents Dreier provided as the
basis for the opinion were illegitimate, the opinion the firm provided to the
lenders “was clearly and unequivocally circumscribed by the qualifications that
[the law firm] assumed the genuineness of all signatures and the authenticity of
the documents, made no independent inquiry into the accuracy of the factual
representations . . . and undertook no independent investigation in ascertaining
those facts.”450 Thus, and because the opinion letter by its terms only stated legal conclusions, the law firm’s statements in the opinion letter were not actionable as misrepresentations.451
Business lawyers may wish to consider limiting their potential liability to
those who might rely on their opinions or representations in appropriate matters. Such limitations are generally permissible under rules of professional con445

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (obligating a
lawyer to “reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished”); Id. r. 1.4(b) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”).
446
See, e.g., Mega Grp., Inc. v. Pechenik & Curro, P.C., 819 N.Y.S.2d 796, 800 (App. Div.
2006) (finding no misrepresentation where “the parties to the sale carefully circumscribed
the details to be contained within the opinion letter” and there was no evidence “that the attorneys were called upon to venture opinions beyond those agreed upon”).
447
Fortress Credit Corp. v. Dechert LLP, 934 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 2011).
448
Id. at 121.
449
Id.
450
Id. at 122.
451
Id. (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood,
605 N.E.2d 318, 322–23 (N.Y. 1992)).
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duct,452 although commercial realities frequently prevent lawyers from seeking
such protections.
For trial lawyers, the threat of liability to third parties for negligent misrepresentation or fraud is greatest when requested to disclose the existence or
amount of liability insurance potentially available to satisfy a judgment or to
fund a potential settlement. Lawyers cannot knowingly misrepresent either the
existence or amount of insurance coverage.453 If they do not want to reveal either the existence or amount of insurance coverage for some strategic reason,
they should simply decline to do so. If they are uncertain about the existence or
amount of insurance coverage when asked about the subject and they are either
required to reveal the information or wish to do so, they should obtain the necessary confirmations before making related commitments or statements.
In summary, all lawyers, regardless of practice area, must appreciate that
they are potential targets of fraud and misrepresentation claims by clients and
third parties. The need for care in lawyers’ communications is constant.

452

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(h)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (governing
lawyers’ ability to prospectively limit their malpractice liability to clients and, by implication, permitting them to limit their liability to non-clients).
453
See, e.g., Fire Ins. Exch. v. Bell, 643 N.E.2d 310, 311–13 (Ind. 1994) (concluding that a
defense lawyer was potentially liable for fraud for misrepresenting to a plaintiff’s lawyer the
amount of insurance coverage applicable to a loss).
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